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Article 102 of the TFEU prohibits abuse of dominant position by one or more 
undertakings within the internal market or in a substantial part of it. It is one of the oldest 
provisions in the history of EU primary law. Its wording remained essentially unchanged since 
1957, when the Treaty of Rome1 was ratified. 
The age and stability of this provision stands in stark contrast to the development its 
application has undergone.2 Even more than 60 years after the adoption of this provision, we are 
witnesses of changes to some of the fundamental aspects of its interpretation and application. It 
has not been left aside in the ongoing process of ‘modernisation’ of EU competition law, a series 
of often quite impactful changes in the approach to competition regulation and enforcement, the 
beginning of which can be traced to the 1990s. This process of modernisation led to changes 
such as the decentralisation of competition enforcement by virtue of the new rules set by 
Regulation 1/20033 as well as a stronger influence of economic thinking and effects-based 
analysis in the application of competition law in general, having the EU regulator focus (at least 
by its own declaration) more on the goals of efficiency and protection of consumers. 
The purpose of this master’s thesis is to map the development of the Art. 102 TFEU 
application practice of the Commission within the boundaries set by the EU courts, as it evolved 
in the last two decades with respect to analysis of the effects of an impugned conduct and the 
application of the consumer welfare standard. This period begins by pre-modernisation decisions 
which were largely dubbed as economic wasteland by Hans Zenger and Mike Walker4 and ends 
by the newest available decisions published well after the Commission’s declared shift to an 
effects-based approach. The development will be discussed in relation to the notion of ‘theory of 
harm’ – broadly speaking, the explanation to what anticompetitive effect did the contested 
conduct lead and how it did or could result in this effect. 
                                                 
1 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. There has been one rather formal change in the wording 
of Art. 102 TFEU from “common market” to “internal market” in 2007. This change stems from Art. 2(2)(g) of 
the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (2007/C 306/01). 
2 For an overview of the historical development of application of Art. 102 TFEU, see e.g. ŠMEJKAL, Václav. 
Soutěžní politika a právo Evropské unie 1950-2015: vývoj, mezníky, tendence a komentované dokumenty. 
Vydání první. Praha: Leges, 2015. Teoretik. ISBN 978-80-7502-108-3.  
3 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L1/1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1-25. 
4 ZENGER, Hans and Mike WALKER. Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress Report 
[online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 2009296. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 2012 





Coverage of this topic is motivated by several factors. First, Art. 102 TFEU is widely 
considered to be in lag with respect to the speed at which other areas of competition law are 
shifting to a more economic approach. There seems to be considerable variability in the way the 
Commission applies theories of harm on a case by case basis. Second, the situation is somewhat 
peculiar given that all the pressure to change seems to be a “bottom-to-top” push by the 
European Commission, without actively being pressured by the EU courts to change its 
enforcement methods. Third, such a shift does not direcly follow from the letter of the law as 
such. Unlike Art. 101(1) TFEU, Art. 102 TFEU does not explicitly mention the effects of the 
dominant undertaking’s conduct. Fourth, as I argue in Chapter 1, a well-developed theory of 
harm based on a transparent methodology may in fact contribute to a higher level of legal 
certainty and foreseeability of competition regulation in this area. Thus, it is a topic worth 
studying. 
The current literature in this area provides a good account on the Art. 102 TFEU 
modernisation as regards the efforts of the Commission in the area of its discussions and soft law 
as well as the reaction of the Court of Justice.5 As regards the effects-based approach as such, 
Pablo Colomo and Alfonso Lamadrid present a good descriptive analysis of the effects-based 
approach in the main areas of EU competition law in relation to the case law of the General 
Court and the Court of Justice.6 Works like the one of Hans Zenger and Mike Walker7 or 
Damien Geradin and Ianis Girgenson8 then discuss the Commission’s and EU courts’ case law 
from the more technical perspective of economic analysis. 
On the other hand, I am not aware of a comprehensive and up-to-date discussion of the 
Commission’s recent Art. 102 TFEU case law from the perspective of the effects-based approach 
with focus on a consumer welfare standard. Moreover, the more analytically focused accounts of 
the inner workings of the effects-based analysis often seem to be presented independently of 
legal analyses of the more general questions addressed in the EU courts’ case law and vice versa. 
This master’s thesis thus strives to present an account that takes into consideration both the more 
                                                 
5 JONES, Alison and Brenda SUFRIN. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. B.m.: Oxford University 
Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-19-872342-4.  
6 IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, Pablo and Alfonso LAMADRID. On the Notion of Restriction of Competition: What We 
Know and What We Don’t Know We Know [online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 2849831. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network. 2016 [Accessed 2018-10-17]. Available 
from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2849831 
7 ZENGER, Hans and Mike WALKER. Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress Report 
[online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 2009296. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 2012 
[Accessed 2018-05-27]. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2009296. 
8 GERADIN, Damien and Ianis GIRGENSON. The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The 
Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach [online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 1970917. Rochester, NY: 






general discussion of the legal boundaries as set by the EU courts with the more economic 
perspective on practical requirements regarding the analysis as such. As competition law does 
and has to dwell on a very fact-specific analysis, I believe that even more general legal analyses 
should not shy away from these more practical questions of competition policy enforcement. To 
this end, I therefore consider necessary to review the case law of the Commission in relation to 
the rulings of EU courts. It is, after all, the Commission, who ultimately has the necessary 
expertise and resources to conduct a proper analysis of the effects of an allegedly anti-
competitive conduct. 
Concerning the methodology, this master’s thesis first provides a descriptive and 
analytical theoretical discussion building on previous literature to identify the legal boundaries 
which limit the Commission’s discretion as to the properties of the analysis in its decisions. The 
Commission’s case law itself will be analytically tested against two basic criteria. Does the 
Commission apply a consumer welfare standard? Does the Commission present a credible 
analysis of the effects of the dominant undertaking’s conduct? Building on the basic insights 
stemming from this analysis, a more qualitative discussion will follow, drawing some general 
conclusions about the Commission’s practical approach to the modernisation of Art. 102 TFEU. 
This should provide a better understanding of whether and how is the effects-based approach 
applied in day to day practice and identify possible problems linked to this approach. 
Regarding the structure of this work, this master’s thesis will consist of six parts, 
including this Introduction. Chapter 1 will focus specifically on the notion of theories of harm in 
antitrust cases and, more specifically, the object of protection and method of determining anti-
competitive effects in competition law, leading to a description of the current state-of-the-art and 
its open questions. A brief description of the development of economic ideas underlying 
competition policy, including the discussion of EU competition law modernisation in relation to 
the more effects-based approach to Art. 102 TFEU will be presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will 
contain the results of the analysis of the competition case law vis a vis the preestablished criteria. 
Finally, Chapter 4 will discuss the results of this analysis. The main findings and possible future 






1. Conceptual Background 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background necessary for tackling 
the issue of assessing the effects of the scrutinised conduct in antitrust cases. On the way, I will 
introduce some basic concepts from economic theory that will ease the discussion of the 
repercussions of the application of competition rules. The first part of this chapter will be 
dedicated to the discussion of these basic concepts and the related theory, while the second part 
will apply these terms in the description of the notion of a theory of harm. 
 
1.1. Basic concepts 
To be able to properly discuss the objects of protection in competition law, the notions of 
economic welfare (using surplus as a metric), efficiency, perfect competition and monopolies 
have to be addressed. The two latter notions represent two ideal and borderline cases of market 
structure. The two former ones serve as theoretical metrics for comparison of markets in general. 
The presented ideas and, more importantly, the way they are presented, are prevailingly 
based on neoclassic economics. One might object that these do not reflect the cutting edge of 
economic theory (of competition and in general). Nevertheless, they are relied on by 
contemporary competition policy.9 It appears suitable to frame the discussion on the aspects of 
competition policy in terms in which it was developed. 
In order not to turn this master’s thesis into an economics textbook, the following notions 
can only be addressed in brevity. For a more detailed account, the reader is invited to consult the 
basic textbook by Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus10 for a more thorough introduction or 
the microeconomics textbook by Raymond Rees and Hugh Gravelle11 for a nuanced discussion 
relying heavily on mathematical modelling. 
 
1.1.1. Economic welfare 
To begin with the first metric for comparing markets, the welfare created by a given 
market is usually analytically determined by its total surplus.12 Economists tend to distinguish so 
                                                 
9 TOR, Avishalom. Should Antitrust Survive Behavioral Economics? [online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 3291886. 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 2018 [Accessed 2019-02-16]. Available 
from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3291886. 
10 SAMUELSON, Paul A. and William D. NORDHAUS. Economics. 19th edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2009. ISBN 978-0-07-351129-0.  
11 GRAVELLE, H. S. E. and Raymond REES. Microeconomics. B.m.: Addison-Wesley Longman, Incorporated, 
1992. ISBN 978-0-582-02386-4.  
12 MOTTA, Massimo. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. B.m.: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 18. 





called consumer surplus, producer surplus and total surplus as the sum of the two former 
surpluses.13 
Simply put, a producer gains surplus every time they sell a good for more than the costs, 
they incurred to produce it. A consumer, on the other hand, gains surplus every time they buy a 
good for less than the maximum price, they are willing to pay for it. Summing up all these 
surpluses (total surplus) then gives us a hypothetical quantification of how much is everyone 
better off thanks to the exchanges of value that have been exercised within the economy.14 It can 
answer the question why we have markets at the first place or, more specifically, how much do 
they contribute to the well-being of the agents involved. 
 
1.1.2. Economic efficiency 
If the notion of surplus informs us how much are we better off thanks to a given market, 
the notion of efficiency helps us to determine if the market can serve its purpose better than it 
currently does or not. There are two distinctions that deserve underlining. The first one is the 
distinction according to the process undertaken within the economy which we want to evaluate. 
This is a common distinction in competition law that recognizes allocative efficiency, productive 
efficiency and dynamic efficiency.15 The other concerns the standard for evaluating efficiency as 
such, the notions of Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are the ones that are 
commonly distinguished. 
Concerning the former distinction based on the evaluated process, allocative efficiency 
describes a state of an equilibrium market where the optimum quantity of the good produced is 
sold for the optimum price, so that no agent could improve its position without worsening the 
position of some other agent, therefore it is also described as the market Pareto optimum. 
Productive efficiency, on the other hand, means that firms produce their goods for the lowest 
possible cost. Finally, dynamic efficiency describes the market development instead of the 
comparatively static equilibria described by the previous two terms. It reflects how a market can 
deliver innovation and technological progress.16 
                                                                                                                                                             
aarguments to the contrary, see e.g. DASKALOVA, Victoria. Consumer welfare in EU competition law: what 
is it (not) about? The Competition Law Review (2015). 2015, 11(1), 131–160. In any event, I do not claim that 
consumer harm is to be determined purely by a reduction in consumer surplus, as can be seen bellow. 
13 SAMUELSON, Paul A. and William D. NORDHAUS. Economics. 19th edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2009, p. 161. ISBN 978-0-07-351129-0.  
14 Ibid, p. 161. 
15 JONES, Alison and Brenda SUFRIN. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. B.m.: Oxford University 






The distinction based on the criterion of efficiency as such does not seem to be discussed 
that much in the context of competition regulation. On one hand, Pareto efficiency means (as 
noted above in relation to the Pareto optimum) that no agent may be made better off without 
making some other agent worse off. Consequently, a Pareto improvement is such a change that 
makes at least one agent better off without worsening anybody else’s position.17 It knows only 
winners and those who are indifferent. 
On the other hand, the requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are less stringent. The 
general condition of a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is based on the notion of an increase of overall 
utility/benefit. If, after implementing a hypothetical measure, the ones who were made better off 
by the measure could reimburse the ones who were made worse off and still be better off, the 
change would present a Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Note that those worse off can be reimbursed 
(that would be a special case of a Pareto improvement) but they do not have to be offered any 
remedy for their losses. Thus, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement may have its losers. This obviously 
grants a policymaker a wider margin within which it can act but also raises issues of how to 
quantify the losses and gains as well as some basic issues of fairness of a such an approach.18 
Nonetheless, I would argue that this criterion is more relevant in the area of regulation, 
competition policy included. One can hardly imagine a measure/decision that would cause no 
harm to anybody if it is supposed to lead to some meaningful change in the society. 
 
1.1.3. Perfect competition 
Moving to the ideal models of markets as such, the idea of perfect competition is a 
remarkably old concept of neoclassical economic theory. It was developed by the end of the 19th 
century by scholars such as Carl Menger, Léon Walras, Alfred Marshall or Arthur Cecil Pigou.19 
Notably, one can find the representatives of the Austrian, Lausanne and Cambridge schools of 
economics of the time in this list, i.e. the representatives of all the major European schools of 
economics of the time.20 
 The model of a market under perfect competition assumes (1) rationality of consumers 
and firms, (2) homogeneity of goods, (3) zero transaction costs, (4) no barriers to entry to the 
market, (5) immediate reaction of agents to changes on the market, (6) no direct influence of 
                                                 
17 WEITZEL, Tim. Economics of Standards in Information Networks. B.m.: Springer Science & Business Media, 
2003, p. 59. ISBN 978-3-7908-0076-0.  
18 Ibid, p. 60. 
19 MUNKOVÁ, Jindřiška. Soutěžní právo. B.m.: C.H. Beck, 2012, p. 6. ISBN 978-80-7400-424-7.  






agents on the process of price formation, (7) no externalities and (8) a very high number of 
consumer and firms.21 
In many ways, perfect competition can be understood as competition at its finest. 
According to neoclassical microeconomic theory, this model leads to allocative and productive 
efficiency. The maximum consumer (and total) surplus is also attained when the assumptions of 
perfect competition are met, and the perfectly competitive market has attained its equilibrium – 
this equilibrium is also a Pareto optimum under the given circumstances.22 
The question of dynamic efficiency is not dealt with in this simple framework, it merely 




As opposed to the model of perfect competition, a monopoly is in many ways an 
antithesis of this model. It simulates a market controlled by one firm that is the only producer of 
a given good. Therefore, it is free to decide upon what will be the quantity produced and what 
will be the price for which the good will be sold, whereas firms under perfect competition are 
price-takers. This setup allows the monopolist to produce for a price that is higher than would be 
the market equilibrium price under perfect competition and reap a part of the total surplus that 
would otherwise belong to the consumers.24 
This comes at a cost. Under the assumptions above, monopolies create so-called dead 
weight loss, a loss in total surplus, that would be otherwise produced under perfect competition 
but is not produced when the market is controlled by a monopolist. As noted e.g. by Alison Jones 
and Brenda Suffrin,25 this is one of the core objections of economists against monopolists – they 
are inefficient in terms of allocative efficiency. 
It is noteworthy, however, that this does not always have to be the case. We can imagine 
a monopolist that is able to exercise perfect price discrimination (also known as first degree 
price discrimination): a price setting mechanism that allows the monopolist to sell a good to a 
certain consumer for the highest price the individual consumer is willing to pay for it and the 
consumers are not able to further resell the bought goods via arbitrage trading. Given such 
                                                 
21 MUNKOVÁ, Jindřiška. Soutěžní právo. B.m.: C.H. Beck, 2012, p. 7. ISBN 978-80-7400-424-7.  
22 Ibid, p. 7. 
23 HOLMAN, Robert. Dějiny ekonomického myšlení. B.m.: Nakladatelství C H Beck, 2005, p. 235. ISBN 978-80-
7179-380-9. 
24 JONES, Alison and Brenda SUFRIN. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. B.m.: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, p. 9. ISBN 978-0-19-872342-4.  





conditions, the monopolist will be incentivised to sell goods to every last consumer to which 
they can be sold without a loss. Consequently, there would be a zero dead weight loss and the 
monopolised market would be just as allocatively efficient as a perfect competitive one.26 
I consider it necessary to mention this hypothetical scenario because it is not all that 
unthinkable, in my opinion. Currently, there are some results available that point in the direction 
of price discrimination conducted by certain online platforms.27 It seems the ever-improving 
ways to construct pricing algorithms are largely restricted only by human imagination and 
regulators (be it competition regulators or others). 
This only points to the relevance of the underlying values of competition regulation. If we 
strictly aim at attaining a Pareto-efficient state on a given market, we might be forced to allow 
for a dominant undertaking fiercely defending its position by whatever means necessary. On the 
other hand, we can aim at protecting the consumers and say that the dominant undertaking 
should not be allowed to fight for and/or defend its position even though its behaviour would 
generate no dead weight loss on the market. It shows the possible problems that might result 
from the notion of competitive harm not being well defined. 
 
1.2. The notion of a theory of harm 
A theory of (anti-competitive) harm is a structural part of an effects-based assessment of 
an allegedly anti-competitive conduct of an undertaking. In broad terms, it is a theoretical 
explanation of the way how a concrete conduct of a concrete undertaking hurts a value protected 
by competition law.28,29 
The vague language is chosen intentionally. There is no dispute as to whether 
competition law should apply only to harmful behaviour or not. In this sense, we can see clear 
endorsements of asking competition authorities and claimants to bring forward theories of harm 
in competition cases in competition law textbooks.30 Indeed, one does not have to delve deep 
                                                 
26 GRAVELLE, Hugh and Ray REES. Microeconomics. 3: e uppl. Harlow: Prentice Hall. 2004, p. 196. ISBN 
9780582404878. 
27 HANNAK, Aniko, Gary SOELLER, David LAZER, Alan MISLOVE a Christo WILSON. Measuring Price 
Discrimination and Steering on E-commerce Web Sites. In: Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet 
Measurement Conference [online]. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 305–318 [Accessed 2019-03-14]. 
IMC ’14. ISBN 978-1-4503-3213-2. Available from: doi:10.1145/2663716.2663744 
28 ZENGER, Hans and Mike WALKER. Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress Report 
[online], p. 1. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 2009296. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 2012 
[Accessed. 2018-05-27]. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2009296. 
29 WHISH, Richard and David BAILEY. Competition Law. B.m.: OUP Oxford, 2012, p. 484. ISBN 978-0-19-
958655-4.  
30 JONES, Alison and Brenda SUFRIN. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. B.m.: Oxford University 





into the literature to find mentions about “type I errors”31 or discussions on the topic of under- or 
over-enforcement.32 
The problem is elsewhere. The opinions start to differ once one delves into the specifics. 
The vague definition above leaves much to be desired. One might start asking questions about 
who or what is supposed to be harmed by the anti-competitive conduct? What is the legal test or 
other standard that should be upheld when determining that the conduct is harmful? Or, once we 
accept that the conduct did not have to cause any actual harm to be anti-competitive, what 
attention should we pay to the possibility/probability of the harm occurring? 
To me, the notion seems to be problematic because it often splits on the differing points 
of view of economic optimality and of legality (although the following positions are more of a 
caricature in their extremism). From a legal perspective, it is a way of establishing causal nexus 
between the conduct of an undertaking and its anti-competitive effect.33 If the analysis of a 
competition case at least strives to be effects-based, establishing how the conduct was or could 
have been harmful is an indispensable step. Applying a more effects-based approach, however, 
as pleasing as the idea might appear to some, raises legitimate concerns about legal certainty of 
competition enforcement across jurisdictions.34 Legal certainty would require a threshold that is 
reasonably foreseeable. In this respect, even a very simple form-based rule (say, that rebates 
conditional on de facto exclusivity should be precluded under any circumstances when stipulated 
by a dominant undertaking)35 will be based on some notion of their harmful nature (the question 
of economic evidence is a different thing here). A lawyer can be satisfied by the rules’ simplicity 
and foreseeability. 
An economist, on the other hand, is more concerned about the properness of the analysis 
as such. This view can be well seen on the example of what Mike Walker and Hans Zenger 
describe as the important aspects of a good theory of harm.36 It should: 
- articulate how competition and, ultimately, consumers will be harmed relative to an 
appropriately defined counterfactual; 
                                                 
31 A case when e.g. an innocent person is falsely identified as guilty (a false positive), unlike the type 2 error, where 
an actual perpetrator is mistakedly declared innocent (a false negative). 
32 JONES, Alison and Brenda SUFRIN. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. B.m.: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, p. 47. ISBN 978-0-19-872342-4.  
33 NIÑO, López and Jonás YAEL. Importancia de una teoría del daño en casos de competencia [online], p. 2. 2015 
[Accessed 2019-03-11]. Available from: http://repositorio-digital.cide.edu/handle/11651/530 
34 STUCKE, Maurice. Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law The Antitrust Marathon: Antitrust and the 
Rule of Law - Discussion - Discussion. Loyola Consumer Law Review. 2009, 22, 28–50.  
35 As was hinted in the now quashed decision of the General Court in Case T‑286/09, Intel Corp. v European 
Commission, EU:T:2014:547. 
36 ZENGER, Hans and Mike WALKER. Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress Report 
[online], p. 1. SSRN Scholarly Paper. ID 2009296. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 2012 





- be logically consistent; 
- be consistent with the incentives that the various parties face; and 
- should be consistent with (or at least not inconsistent with) the available empirical 
evidence. 
The reader may note that, except for the value-based presumption of who/what is 
protected by competition law, all the above considerations are of a methodological nature. Their 
faithful application will lead to a proper analysis and a minimisation of type I errors. What this 
view lacks, is the stress on legal certainty and foreseeability. Also, a proper in-depth economic 
analysis is not the same thing as a speedy analysis, quite to the contrary.37 It is not necessary to 
stress that this can run counter the requirement of the investigation’s result being not only fair 
and foreseeable, but also reasonably quick. 
This is nothing new per se. Lawyers and economists do have their differences when it 
comes to competition regulation. As explained by Giorgio Monti,38 it is to be expected that some 
necessary simplification of economic theory will occur when applied by lawyers. It does not stop 
at simplicity, though. When accepting that the law as such is not a value-neutral system,39 we can 
come to the conclusion that lawyers will naturally ask questions concerning the purpose of a 
certain regulation, its (ir)reconcilability with a specified set of values. Competition law is no 
different. 
The contrast outlined above is more than just a theoretical remark. The requirement of 
legal certainty and the requirement of a ‘proper’ analysis are both not to be taken lightly. As 
noted by Maurice Stucke in a more comprehensive list of requirements,40 the antitrust legal 
standard should 
- promote accuracy (and thus minimise false positives and false negatives); 
- be administrable and thus easy to apply; 
- be consistent and thus yield predictable results; 
- be objective (and thus minimise the subjective input from decision makers); 
- have a broadly applicable standard; and 
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- be transparent (including the objective of the applied standard).41 
These requirements might seem to be contradictory at least to some degree. To a large 
extent, they just reflect the combination of the requirements of the two approaches outlined 
above, though. It is hardly imaginable how to minimise false positives and false negatives 
without looking at the effects of the conduct at least to some degree. And what about the legal 
certainty? A well-specified theory of harm might be the only saving grace in this respect. Once 
we depart from well-established form-based rules, it is only a transparent, consistent and ideally 
broadly applicable methodology of assessment that can ensure that the outcomes of competition 
investigation and litigation are foreseeable and consistent to a reasonable degree. 
Based on the discussion above, two main aspects of theories of harm contained in the 
Commission’s decisions will be addressed for every case. The first is value-driven. It answers 
the question, what is claimed to be harmed in the concrete decision. This is relevant in the light 
of the Commission’s pledge to apply a consumer welfare standard in its decisions pursuant to the 
Guidance Paper,42 as explained in Chapter 2. The second aspect is of a more technical nature. It 
concerns the standard applied by the Commission – did the Commission run a credible analysis 
of the effects of the conduct in question? This is relevant in the light of the accuracy of 
enforcement of competition law. The remainder of this chapter will explore more closely these 
two aspects of a theory of harm in competition cases, establishing what is already known and 
what questions remain open. 
 
1.3. Who or what is supposed to be harmed? 
This is perhaps one of the most intuitive questions to be asked. It is sometimes swept 
away without much attention. One of the more popular phrases states that the undertaking’s anti-
competitive behaviour is susceptible to cause harm to competition and, ultimately, to 
consumers.43 This is not to say that this issue would not be discussed or that it is supposed to be 
simple to answer. A thorough discussion of this topic would exceed the scope of this thesis. 
Therefore, I can only present some of the main conclusions and explanations. For a more 
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thorough discussion of this topic or at least some of its facets, there are other works confined to 
this question specifically, be in in the EU44,45 or in the USA for a comparative perspective. 46 
To begin, the phrase quoted above gives us two likely candidates: consumers and 
competition as such, the process of competition. In the context of EU competition law, the goal 
of integration of the EU single market is supposed to play an important part as well.47 Other 
parties which might be harmed by the dominant undertaking’s activities are also its direct 
competitors. Lastly, there are also more specific theories of competitive harm that have some 
overlap with other general goals, such as the theory of consumer choice restriction,48 that could 
be arguably linked to the broader question of consumer well-being. 
 
1.3.1. Other competitors? 
Other competitors of the undertaking in question are one of the clearer cases. It is a well-
established notion in (not only) EU competition law, that competition law does not seek to 
protect other competitors as such. If a competitor is e.g. driven out of the market or foreclosed by 
a dominant undertaking because of being less efficient, it cannot (generally) avail itself of 
competition law protection.49 
This is closely linked to the idea of competition on the merits, which is to be promoted 
instead of being stifled. On the other hand, protecting competitors at least as efficient as the 
dominant undertaking, perhaps by applying the as-efficient-competitor (AEC) test,50 should help 
to promote and protect competition and market efficiency. But even in such a case, it is not 
primarily the competitor as such who is protected in this scenario. 
1.3.2. Competition as a process? 
The notion of competition and its protection, as much as it is one of the cornerstones of 
competition law, is not entirely clearly defined. Robert Bork lists five definitions of competition, 
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namely competition as (i) the process of rivalry, (ii) the absence of restraint over one firm’s 
economic activities by another firm, (iii) the state of the market in which the individual buyer or 
seller does not influence the price by his purchases or sales, (iv) the existence of fragmented 
industries and markets, and (v) a state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased 
by moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial decree.51 While Jiří Kindl argues that 
it is not necessary to specify the notion of competition as such for the purposes of competition 
regulation (focusing rather on the notion of effective competition),52 the different takes on the 
definition of competition mentioned above do reflect differing ideas about and approaches to 
competition regulation. When scrutinising the effect on competition, these different approaches 
will necessarily influence the formulation of the theory of harm in question. 
At least historically speaking, the first two of the five definitions seem to have been 
dominant in EU competition regulation. The idea of protection of competition as a process 
appears to be more appealing and accepted, it has been also endorsed by the Court of Justice as 
early as in 1973.53 It seems to stem at least partly from the ideal of competition law protecting 
economic freedom as proposed by the German school of ordoliberalists,54 which was historically 
very influential in Germany.55 
Building on the concepts of consumer/total surplus and efficiency addressed above, we 
have the tools to tell why competition as a process is (at least seemingly) supposed be defended – 
note that the definition of competition as a state of efficiency (the fifth Bork’s definition) was 
stated separately. 
As mentioned above, according to neoclassical microeconomic theory, the maximum 
consumer (and total) surplus is attained when the assumptions of perfect competition are met, 
and the perfectly competitive market has attained its equilibrium. On the other hand, markets 
controlled by a single monopoly tend to allow the monopolist to dictate a price higher that would 
be the equilibrium price under perfect competition and consequently create a dead weight loss on 
the given market. Thus, the argument for protection of competition as such would appear to be 
the goal of creating as much surplus as possible (and thus focus on allocative efficiency). 
Such an argument might thus appear satisfying also in the light of welfare maximisation, 
but there are certain caveats. To begin with, protecting competition for the sake of allocative 
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efficiency probably would not be enough. There is a case to be made for the protection of 
dynamic efficiency as well, as in certain markets, a large portion of competition appears to 
consist in innovation races among the competitors, such as markets for search engines.56 
Moreover, there are numerous examples where the protection of economic freedom 
and/or the process of competition as such might yield results detrimental to efficiency of a 
market. Fox example, it makes perfect sense to ban resale price maintenance (a producer setting 
contractual boundaries on the prices of its products resold by the distributor)57 in general, insofar 
the protection of competition as a process is based on an economic freedom rationale. 
Nonetheless, it is often argued by economists that this will not necessarily lead to the best 
possible outcome in terms of efficiency.58 Particularly, an empirical study supporting this 
argument in context of US competition regulation was conducted by Pauline Ippolito.59 
More generally, as noted above, there can be cases in which competition has been 
completely wiped out on a given market, but the market is nonetheless allocatively efficient. In 
this respect, the goals of protecting competition as a process can be better aligned with the goal 
of protecting consumers. Of course, protection of competition as such cannot be confused with 
the notion of direct and immediate consumer harm. As noted by Václav Šmejkal,60 there are 
cases when the protection of competition might be even considered to be harmful at least in the 
short run. On the other hand, in the light of the abovementioned, protection of competition of a 
process seems to be a better tool to ensure that consumers should not be deprived from the 
benefits of conducting exchange, unlike focusing on a similar looking criterion, like efficiency as 
such. 
1.3.3. Consumers? 
Another widespread claim about competition law is that it protects consumers. This idea 
is widespread in political statements of EU officials61 as well as in soft law materials of the 
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Commission.62 On the other hand, while acknowledged by the Court of Justice, it also expressly 
noted that it is not the only goal of competition policy in relation to Art. 101 TFEU.63 There is no 
reason to believe that such a conclusion would not apply to Art. 102 TFEU as well. Nevertheless, 
the goal of consumer protection seems to be accepted by many at least as a declaration of one of 
the main purposes of competition law. 
One must note, however, that the concept of a ‘consumer’ is not to be interpreted as 
restrictively as in consumer protection law. Indeed, the Commission itself notes that the notion 
of a consumer as a subject of protection of competition law encompass intermediate producers, 
distributors as well as final consumers64 (one could thus think of consumers as downstream 
customers of a given undertaking rather than just consumers in the narrow legal sense). Thus, 
according to the statements considering consumers to be the main subject of protection in 
competition law (or one of the main ones), the direct and indirect customers of a given industry 
seem to be the ones that are the protected group, the intended beneficiaries of well-functioning 
competitive markets. 
This is a statement departing from the simple question concerning allocative efficiency. It 
deals with justice of the system of allocation instead. It is more in line with the lawyer’s 
approach to competition policy because it has a clearer ideological foundation, it gives a clearer 
telos to the concrete measures which have to be justified before the members of a community. 
That easily explains the way the goal of consumer protection is often mentioned in political 
statements.65 Being value driven, it also departs from the notion of positive economics where the 
more universal measure of reduction of total welfare (surplus) is more accepted by economists.66 
This might not present that much of a problem in itself, but there are other practical issues of this 
criterion that have to be addressed. 
For example, not only that consumer welfare is not a value-neutral criterion, it does not 
tend to be (and probably even should not be) interpreted as a purely technical and quantitative 
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test of consumer surplus reduction.67 This however results in the criterion becoming vaguer than 
would be desirable. 
Perhaps for this reason, the consumer in EU competition law often figures as an ultimate 
subject of protection who has to be kept in mind rather than a litmus paper, the direct harm to 
which would imply anti-competitive behaviour. This can be be seen on some of the definitions of 
theories of anti-competitive harm mentioned above, according to which one an anti-competitive 
conduct is harmful to competition and ultimately to consumers. 
 
1.3.4. Market integration? 
Following Art. 3(3) TEU, the Union shall establish an internal market. This is promoted 
by various rules against barriers to free movement of production inputs, outputs and capital (in 
the financial sense). Following Protocol No 27 to the Treaties,68 the internal market includes a 
system ensuring that competition is not distorted. 
This particular subject of protection is typical for EU law. The result of the application of 
this goal is e.g. the prohibition of price discrimination across borders.69 Forbidding exclusive 
distribution agreements for the territory of one Member State70 follows a similar rationale. 
The intellectual basis for this protection is legal/political (as can be seen above) and, in 
fact, apparently cannot be based on any economic rationale related to efficiency or welfare 
maximization.71 Indeed, one of the cited examples where the pursuit of market integration 
ultimately trumped efficiency of the economy overall is the case of United Distillers (Red 
Label),72 where a special charge was added to the price of purchases of whisky which was 
supposed to be exported from the UK to other Member States. Eventually, the Commission’s 
opposition to this dual pricing scheme led to an increase of the price of some of the distillates 
sold in the UK and the Johnny Walker Red Label whisky has been withdrawn from sale in the 
UK while other products were no longer promoted in other Member States, which can hardly be 
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consistent with any consumer or other welfare standard.73 Admittedly, the lesson of this (quite 
old) case can be that the market integration criterion cannot be applied blindly. Nonetheless, as a 
criterion, it stands largely independent and separate from the more ‘economic’ criteria and 
should be understood this way. 
1.3.5. Other subjects of protection? 
Aside the most common subjects mentioned above, other values can be protected by 
competition law. Under the header of ‘other public policy factors’, Massimo Motta lists social 
reasons, political reasons, environmental reasons and strategic reasons.74 
While political reasons will always be hard to identify, as a competition authority or a 
court would hardly admit to factoring in political considerations in their evaluation, other 
considerations are more pronounced. E.g. environmental protection is accepted more explicitly. 
In the CECED75 decision, for example, where a vast majority of washing machine manufacturers 
decided to stop importing and producing the least energy efficient category of machines. While 
the Commission found this agreement to clearly restrict competition by object, the reduction in 
electricity consumption and other environmental considerations led the Commission to clear the 
agreement as legal. 
There is a certain political push to factor considerations such as environmental or social 
harm more into the competition policy decisions. For example, the European Parliament 
criticized the Commission as recently as in early 201976 for not taking environmental and climate 
considerations into account in the Bayer/Monsanto merger.77 
The strategic considerations, on the other hand, are more linked to trade policies. The 
push for ‘national champions’ or the US law allowing for export cartels are a manifestation of 
this thinking. Nevertheless, competition policy is usually not considered to be the proper tool to 
protect the country’s position in international trade. These will more likely be governed by trade 
policies and, on the EU level, state aid rules.78 
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1.4. How to determine anti-competitive effects? 
 
1.4.1. Actual harm? Probable harm? Possible harm? 
Having discussed what is there to be harmed, the next logical question seems to be 
whether this protected group/values has in fact been harmed? First, it already follows from 
established case law that it does not have to be shown that the actual effects have taken place to 
determine that a conduct is anti-competitive.79 This is a logical conclusion. It makes no sense to 
wait and observe the anti-competitive effects of a conduct to take place if we have already 
established their restrictive nature. Moreover, and as will be shown further, it would not help all 
that much with the determination of anti-competitiveness at the first place. 
What seems more problematic in this respect is the standard of assessment as to the 
probability of the effects taking place. Indeed, while it is not contested that the harm caused by 
the conduct cannot be purely hypothetical,80 there is no clear answer about the actual likelihood 
of this non-hypothetical harm materializing.81 
In fact, there are two terms that seem to be used to identify a standard for probability of 
the conduct leading to an anti-competitive effect, capability and likelihood.82 From the natural 
meaning of the words itself, likelihood appears to signify a stricter threshold to be fulfilled. 
The question of the probabilistic standard in the assessment of dominant undertakings’ 
conduct regarding Art. 102 TFEU has been explicitly addressed by AG Kokott in Post Danmark 
II83 and by AG Wahl in Intel,84 two cases concerning allegedly exclusionary rebate schemes (the 
latter dealt with the question of loyalty-inducing rebates that are considered presumptively 
unlawful since the decision in Hoffmann-La Roche).85 AG Kokott seems to set the standard to be 
that the exclusionary effect must be more likely than not86 – far from being effectively certain 
but still the most likely outcome. This has been explicitly rejected by AG Wahl, who (not 
accepting a material difference between the criteria of likelihood and capability) advocates to set 
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the threshold to the question if the contested conduct would lead to a foreclosure effect in all 
likelihood. 
Setting the test to merely prevailing likelihood, as done by AG Kokott, might otherwise 
lead to a high proportion of type I errors.87 Following such a criterion can lead to a rate of error 
hypothetically approaching up to a good half of the cases if we accept the interpretation by Pablo 
Colomo and Alfonso Lamadrid,88 who claim that AG Kokott’s criterion can be interpreted as 
requiring a likelihood (probability) over 50%. Considering such a test too lenient, AG Wahl 
proposes to ascertain at least that the effects of the conduct will not be ambivalent or ancillary 
even in cases of presumptively unlawful conduct. Otherwise, a more thorough analysis should be 
conducted.89 
Another proposed solution to the likelihood benchmark rests on the division of Art. 102 
TFEU abuses on ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ abuses. Taking inspiration from Art. 101(1) TFEU, it 
is sometimes argued that certain conducts that are presumptively unlawful under Art. 102 TFEU 
(as the loyalty rebates mentioned above) can be, practically speaking, compared to ‘by object’ 
restrictions for the purposes of Art. 101(1) TFEU, while other restrictions that are not deemed 
abusive by their very nature could be treated as ‘by effect’ restrictions.90 Then the ‘by object’ 
(presumptively unlawful) restrictions would be tested against the capability benchmark, i.e. the 
conduct in question can plausibly lead to anti-competitive effects. On the other hand, ‘by effect’ 
restrictions (ambivalent or neutral) would have to be tested against the likelihood benchmark – 
the conduct in question probably will restrict (say) competition. Pablo Colomo and Alfonso 
Lamadrid argue that this distinction has been already hinted by the Court of Justice in the 
wording it standardly uses in abuse of dominance cases.91 
It must be noted that this approach, although perhaps accepted even by some members of 
the Commission’s staff,92 has been subject to some critique. Notably, Nicolas Petit argues that 
establishing an Art. 101(1) TFEU ‘by object’ restriction leads to a shift in the burden of proof, 
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which leaves the defendant the only option to rely on an Art. 101(3) TFEU efficiency 
justification. On the contrary, even when a presumptively unlawful conduct under Art. 102 
TFEU is established, the defendant should be able to argue that it did not have any anti-
competitive effect. 93 
Nevertheless, I would argue that even if we reject to equate ‘by object’ Art. 101(1) TFEU 
restrictions to presumptively unlawful conduct under Art. 102 TFEU in all of their substantive 
and procedural aspects, subdividing conduct under Art. 102 TFEU to presumptively unlawful 
and ‘neutral’ can find footing in the case law of the Court of Justice and can serve a practical 
purpose. First, a presumption of unlawfulness does not necessarily have to contradict the 
requirement of having a likelihood threshold. In principle, certain categories can prove to have 
likely anti-competitive effects by their very nature and running a costly and painstaking analysis 
of the effects would be redundant.94 
As a perhaps not that forcible synthesis of the approach of AG Wahl and that of Pablo 
Colomo and Alfonso Lamadrid, it can be argued that one can propose to split the likelihood 
criterion into two different tests. When dealing with presumptively abusive conduct which is 
likely to have anti-competitive effects by its very nature, one should at least verify that the 
conduct’s effect is not apparently ancillary and/or ambivalent, given the legal and economic 
circumstances of the case. If doubts about the effects arise or the conduct is ‘neutral’ by its 
nature, a broader and costlier analysis would have to be carried out to establish whether the anti-
competitive effect was to occur in all likelihood. This could use the benefit of legal presumptions 
allowing to avoid an expensive analysis where it is not necessary,95 and, at the same time, lower 
the probability of over-enforcement. 
In any event, when talking about the threshold of likelihood, I agree with AG Wahl on 
the point that the test should be stricter than merely stating that the effect should be more likely 
than not. If such a test were followed to the letter, even quite ambivalent cases could result in a 
declared breach of Art. 102 TFEU – this could lead to quite a staggering rate of 
overenforcement, as explained above. 
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1.4.2. What extent does the harm have to have to establish a breach of Art. 102 TFEU? 
While comparing Art. 101 TFEU to Art. 102 TFEU, another question that might arise is 
the one of what extent should the harm have. When applying Art. 101 TFEU, the de minimis rule 
applies: if the effects of a cartel under Art. 101 TFEU are negligible, the cartel does not fall into 
the scope of Art. 101 TFEU.96 Should the same rule apply to Art. 102 TFEU? 
The simple answer is no. The Court of Justice rejected this idea by arguing that 
competition on a market is already weakened by the simple fact there is dominant undertaking. 
Any further restrictions, however negligible, shall thus be prohibited.97 
It may have been unclear whether the same held for the effects of an abuse that did occur 
on a market where the undertaking in question did not hold a dominant position. Obviously, the 
argument of further restriction/further strengthening of dominant position does not hold in this 
case. Before Post Danmark II, the unwillingness to accept an appreciability threshold was 
criticized e.g. by Richard Whish and David Bailey98 because it did not seem to fit in the context 
of the remaining body of EU competition law, where the appreciability criterion is considered in 
one way or another. 
If the de minimis doctrine was accepted as a general principle of EU competition law and 
the argument raised in Post Danmark II was an exception to this principle, one could agree with 
the claim of Justice Roth made in the UK case Streetmap v Google,99 that an effect of an anti-
competitive conduct has to pass the appreciability benchmark, if it takes place on a market where 
the undertaking in question does not hold a dominant position. 
This approach seems to have been invalidated by the recent MEO ruling of the Court of 
Justice at latest, though. There,100 the Court addressed and rejected the question of applying the 
de minimis threshold in the context of possible anti-competitive effects on the downstream 
market of the dominant undertaking. Thus, the application of a de minimis rule for cases of abuse 
of dominance can be rejected as a matter of principle. 
 
1.4.3. How to test for harm in the first place? 
As mentioned in the previous section, there is in many ways not that much of a 
theoretical difference between testing for actual harm and likely harm. Abuse of dominant 
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position is illegal by the very abusiveness of the conduct, not by the result observed on the 
market. Thus, an undertaking will be unsuccessful if it claims in its defence that its competitors 
have in fact performed well during the period of the allegedly abusive conduct.101 Similarly, the 
mere fact that and undertaking was driven out of business is not proof that its dominant rival has 
done something wrong.102 
If we want to move beyond the application of purely form-based rules (certain types of 
conduct would be abusive without any regard to their effect whatsoever), a proper analysis of the 
conduct’s actual effects (at least in the light of the considerations above) has to answer the 
following question: how were the conditions of competition changed in result of the abusive 
conduct? In other words, the conduct has to be compared with the hypothetical scenario of the 
same market where the allegedly abusive conduct did not occur. This hypothetical scenario is 
called a counterfactual. More specifically, an ex post counterfactual, because it is ‘looking back’: 
what would the world look like if the conduct did not occur? This method is mostly relevant for 
Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 102 TFEU investigations. Conversely, the ex ante counterfactual asks 
the question, how will the world change if a certain event (usually a transaction) occurs. This 
approach is used in merger cases as well as in the undertaking’s own analysis done to refrain of a 
potentially anti-competitive behaviour 103. It must be noted that this distinction is not perfectly 
clear cut. There are scenarios where Art. 102 TFEU cases have to be effectively based on an ex 
ante analysis while some merger cases have to be at least partly based on a backwards looking 
inquiry.104 
The need to use counterfactuals in the assessment of Art. 102 TFEU cases has been 
acknowledged by the Commission in its soft law.105 In fact, setting up a benchmark situation 
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which compares the world influenced by the dominant undertaking’s conduct with a world 
devoid of it can provide a clearer explanation of the otherwise nebulous term abuse contained in 
Art. 102 TFEU. Indeed, it allows a competition authority to analyse all the circumstances of the 
case.106 
This being said, even after issuing its Guidance Paper, the Commission’s use of 
counterfactuals in its analysis in Art. 102 TFEU investigations was not devoid of critique. Even 
if present, in some cases the counterfactuals were claimed to be too simplistic or 
underdeveloped.107 
 
1.5. Criteria of assessment 
Based on the discussion above, the description of each of the cases in the analytical part 
provides an answer as to (1) whether the Commission applied a consumer welfare standard and 
(2) whether the Commission analysed the effects of the conduct as to the protected value. If the 
Commission claims multiple breaches and only some rely on the given criterion, the case will be 
counted as not fulfilling the criterion in general in the final discussion. This approach seems 
reasonable to me. It does not appear that the Commission felt the necessity to prove effects of a 
conduct aiming at consumers to act if it merely uses it as a supportive argument in a broader 
context of a given case. 
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2. Article 102 TFEU Modernisation 
 
In this chapter, the development of the basic ideas underlying the modernisation of EU 
competition law will be laid out briefly to explain the heading of competition policy that was 
declared by the Commission. The chapter is split into two parts, the first one discussing the 
development of the idea of and reasoning underlying the wave of EU competition law 
modernisation and the second one talking about the question of modernisation in relation to 
abuse of dominance under Art. 102 TFEU specifically. 
 
2.1. Evolving ideas underlying competition law 
When talking about the modernisation of EU competition law, there are two notions to be 
distinguished:108 (1) the overhaul of the procedural application of EU competition law linked to 
the adoption of Regulation 1/2003109 (‘the modernisation regulation’) and (2) the Commission’s 
gradual shift to a ‘more economic approach’ to the enforcement of substantive provisions of EU 
law. While the former notion is certainly an important milestone in the development of EU 
competition law with many important repercussions, this chapter focuses on the latter notion of 
the shift in the approach to the substantive provisions of EU competition law that market shift to 
a ‘more economic approach’. 
In this sense, modernisation is an era that is usually claimed to begin during the mid to 
late 1990s in form of a run up to the adoption of the modernisation regulation.110 Some place the 
milestone at the very beginning of this decade, on the other hand,111 linking the change to the 
adoption of the fist merger control regulation.112 Besides this regulation, the beginning of the 
epoch is marked by the Commission issuing documents like the White Paper on Modernisation 
of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.113 This document served mainly 
as a manifesto putting forward reasons for the change of procedural rules governing EU 
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competition law. Nonetheless, the Commission has also voiced its intention to adopt a more 
economic approach, at least in relation to the application of today’s Art. 101(1) TFEU.114 
As for the changes that were brought by the era of modernisation, it would be misleading 
to claim that the Commission’s approach simply lacked proper economic reasoning before and 
therefore started to take economic thinking more into account.115 Rather, the Commission’s 
reasoning was formed by the ordoliberal approach to competition policy in the early years of its 
decision making.116 This led to the result that competition policy in the EU was largely aimed at 
protection of the economic freedom of market participants and reductions of this freedom were 
often understood to be anti-competitive. The ‘more economic approach’ to the application of 
substantive provisions of EU law was thus more of shift of attention from the process of 
competition to its result.117 In this case, the result deserving protection was consumer welfare, as 
declared by the Commission in its soft law documents as well as through its high-profile 
representatives.118 
The reasons to undertake this change might have been linked to change in the underlying 
reasoning of competition policy but it can be also be better understood in the context of 
cooperation between the Commission and the government of the USA in this area. On 23 
September 1991, an agreement regarding the application of competition law was signed between 
the Commission and the United States government.119 Article IV of this agreement talks about 
coordination of enforcement activities while deals with avoidance of conflicts over enforcement 
activities. Moreover, the first merger control regulation was the first instance when the 
Commission invited American experts to help with its preparation.120 The modernisation of 
competition law can thus be also understood as a way to reconcile the differences between US 
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and EU antitrust law. Both sets of rules regulate large economies and divergent results in high-
profile cases did bring their own set of problems, as remarked by Andre Fiebig.121 
As a final remark, while consumer welfare as the value protected by competition law was 
largely championed by the Commission in relation to modernisation of EU competition law, the 
related question of the effects-based approach to some areas of competition law was strongly 
influenced by EU courts. This holds specifically for the case of merger control. As noted by 
Mike Walker and Hans Zenger, the Commission lost a number of merger cases 2002 because 
they lacked a proper theory of harm.122 Thus, while the shift to the consumer welfare standard 
was not endorsed by EU courts as a necessary criterion in antitrust case law, they have played a 
role in forcing the Commission to set a higher standard for assessment of anti-competitive effects 
in some areas of competition regulation. 
 
2.2. Evolving ideas underlying the application of Article 102 TFEU 
The area of application and enforcement of Art. 102 TFEU was for long a notable 
exception to the development described above. Still heavily influenced by the ordoliberal 
approach to competition regulation, it has comparatively seen the least progress in this respect. 
Indeed, in the words of a paper co-authored by a former member of the Chief Economist Team 
in DG Competition, [m]ost of the established case law on unilateral conduct is economic 
wasteland.123 
A formal review of Art. 102 was essentially started by the Commission in 2003124 and its 
results were opened to public scrutiny when the Commission published the DG Competition 
discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses.125 This 
eventually led, after a public debate containing some mixed reactions,126 to the Commission 
publishing the Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
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the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings127 in 2009, a new soft 
law document bringing forward a new approach to the application of Art. 102 TFEU (at least in 
the area of exclusionary conduct). It proposed new approaches like focusing on types of conduct 
most harmful to consumers.128 Perhaps most importantly, the Commission distinguishes 
foreclosure and anti-competitive foreclosure. While many kinds of conduct can lead to e.g. a 
restriction of access of competitors to the market (foreclosure), the Commission has vouched to 
focus on such cases of foreclosure, where the conduct is likely to be detrimental to consumers 
(anti-competitive foreclosure).129 
A simple case of foreclosure would be likely enough to establish a breach of Art. 102 
TFEU under a theory of harm based on the ordoliberal school of thought. The Commission’s 
focus on anti-competitive foreclosure thus departs from the ordoliberal approach to embrace a 
consumer welfare standard. Perhaps just somewhat belated, as a similar document aimed at the 
application of Art. 101(3) TFEU (that introduced a new conceptual background for Art. 101 
TFEU as a whole) was issued years earlier, in 2004.130 
The situation is nevertheless somewhat more peculiar. The Commission’s attempts to 
shift to (1) a more effects-based approach, and (2) a consumer welfare standard, are a bottom to 
top effort. The consumer welfare standard was never endorsed as a necessary criterion by EU 
courts. Even concerning the relevant standard for establishing anti-competitive effects in general, 
the Commission was not forced into the position by EU courts as in merger control cases. 
Moreover, the general rule contained in Art. 102 TFEU contains no mention of effects of 
the conduct. It does not follow explicitly from the wording of the provision that one should 
examine the effects of the dominant undertaking’s conduct. This can be compared to the wording 
of Art. 101(1) TFEU, which clearly distinguishes between by object and by effect infringements. 
Thus, it did not directly follow from the letter of the law as such or the case law applying 
it, that the Commission should change its approach to abuse of dominance by subjecting the 
effects of the conduct to closer scrutiny or focusing consumer welfare. 
On the contrary, the Commission has been very successful in Art. 102 TFEU lawsuits, at 
least until recently. It was able to successfully defend a vast majority (as much as 98% according 
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to Damien Neven’s claim made in 2006)131 of its Art. 102 TFEU decisions the way they were, 
leaving little incentive to active change in the actual case law of EU courts. 
Also, the Guidance Paper being a soft law document devised by an EU administrative 
body, it’s acceptance by the EU courts has been reluctant to say the least.132 It is thus largely a 
question of how the Commission decides to enforce Art. 102 TFEU, as many ideas proposed in 
Guidance Paper are certainly not contrary to EU competition law per se but they are also usually 
not the only way Art. 102 TFEU could be applied. The EU courts’ guidance on the matter of 
theories of harm in Art. 102 TFEU decision making still leaves space for various degrees of 
scrutiny. This underlines the importance of analysing the approach of the Commission as such. 
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3. Case Law Analysis 
 
The selection of the case law subjected to analysis was based on all the Commissions 
decisions on infringement of Art. 102 TFEU issued in the year 2000 or later (if a version of the 
decision is publicly available). This criterion is based on the following considerations. 
First, the selection of case law provides samples from three distinct periods in the 
Commission’s practice: (1) the decisions made before the introduction of Regulation 1/2003,133 
(2) the decisions made under the new procedural regime and (3) the decisions made after the 
introduction of the Commission’s Guidance Paper. As the selection spans over almost twenty 
years, any trends and developments in the Commission’s approach should be clearly visible. 
Second, only prohibition decisions134 have been selected because other decisions, such as 
e.g. acceptance of commitments following Art. 9 of the regulation do not usually contain as 
detailed an analysis of the undertaking’s conduct as prohibition decisions. 
Third, and finally, this selection makes the analysis manageable in terms of sheer volume 
of the decisions to be analysed. As of the date of finishing the manuscript of this master’s thesis, 
21 reasoned Commission decisions fulfilling the set criteria were publicly available on the DG 
Competition’s webpage. This ensures both a good degree of representativeness and the 
possibility to address the decisions one by one. 
On a practical note regarding the selection of the decisions, the search tool in the database 
of DG Competition’s decisions is unfortunately not quite user friendly. Even a clear search query 
for ‘Art. 102 TFEU’ (including ‘Art. 82 EC Treaty’) decisions does not seem to yield the 
intuitively expected results. The search results combine Art. 102 TFEU decisions with Art. 101 
TFEU cartel prohibitions etc. The selection of the decisions discussed in this master’s thesis has 
thus been made with help of cross-reference to DG Competition’s annual reports that fortunately 
include a statistic on Art. 102 TFEU prohibition decisions made every year. 
 
3.1. Year 2001 
The first year that yielded decisions fitting the set criteria was 2001. The Commission has 
issued four decisions in total. Two concerned Deutsche Post, the German provider of mail 
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services, the other concerned the Belgian provider of postal services La Poste and the French tire 
producer Michelin. 
 
3.1.1. Deutsche Post (international mail charges) 
The first decision in proceedings against the dominant German provider of postal services 
Deutsche Post was based on a complaint brought forward by the British Post Office, the UK’s 
public postal operator. Deutsche Post had higher charges for the processing and delivery of 
domestic mail as compared to the charges incoming international mail. In the case of so-called 
A-B-A remail (mail sent from country A back to country A via country B), Deutsche Post 
charged domestic prices to A-B-A remail. It claimed this was necessary to stop circumvention of 
domestic tariffs. It identified incoming mail as A-B-A remail based on any reference to the 
sender being located in Germany (typically by the contact address for answers). Deutsche Post 
enforced surcharges on incoming international mail, intercepted it and delayed it. 
The Commission found the conduct to be an abuse of Deutsche Post’s dominant position 
on the relevant market of forwarding and delivery of incoming cross border mail in Germany. 
According to the Commission, Deutsche Post’s conduct was abusive in four ways. It amounted 
to discrimination, a refusal to supply, excessive pricing and limitation of markets. The 
conclusions concerning discrimination and excessive pricing were based on the finding that 
Deutsche Post provided the same kind of service in cases of international mail in general and 
incoming mail incorrectly identified as A-B-A remail based on Deutsche Post’s broad 
definition.135 
Regarding the theory of harm spelled out in the decision, the Commission relies on both 
economic and societal considerations of the impact of the abuse, namely competition as a 
process and consumer welfare. Competition as a process is argued to be compromised because 
Deutsche Post’s competitors on the UK’s outbound international mail market were supposed to 
be subject to a competitive disadvantage. The impact on consumers is stated quite clearly in the 
decision, the Commission goes so far to say actual harm to both senders and addressees has 
occurred by enforcing surcharges.136 This implies a reduction in consumer welfare. 
Moreover, although not argued explicitly, the decision is coherent with the objective 
market integration, as the prohibited conduct seemed to impede centralised mail distribution of 
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transnational companies – having one centre for sending bulk mail for across the Union in a 
single Member State (and possibly having national contact points for responses to this mail).137 
As concerns the methods implemented, the Commission’s assessment is prevailingly 
form based. One of the central points is that the different tariffs charged by [Deutsche Post] 
cannot be justified on the basis of objective economic factors.138 A brief empirical analysis can 
be found in the argumentation concerning the imposition of unfair selling prices (to roughly infer 
Deutsche Post’s costs on the basis of some European comparators)139 but the decision does not 
seem to stand and fall on this analysis. It is merely one strand of the Commission’s arguments, 
where the other ones do not rely on such considerations. 
 
3.1.2. Deutsche Post (parcel services) 
The second Deutsche Post decision considered its commercial parcel delivery services. 
Two aspects of its conduct were questioned by the Commission: the possibility of predatory 
pricing (allowed for by the undertaking’s profits earned in its other activities) and the rebates 
stipulated in its contracts. The Commission concluded that Deutsche Post abused its dominant 
position on the relevant market for domestic parcel services in Germany both by implementing 
predatory pricing strategies and introducing loyalty rebates.140 
The object of harm induced by the conduct in question seems to be societal, based on 
ordoliberal notions. The theory of harm focuses on a likely reduction of access of new 
competitors to the relevant market.141 
The test for the abuse in question is effects-based as regards the issue of restriction of 
competition by predatory pricing and purely formal in relation to the loyalty rebates. It took 
merely to find that Deutsche Post’s rebates were loyalty rebates for the purposes of the case law 
of the Court of Justice to conclude that they are supposed to have an anti-competitive effect.142 
The question of predatory pricing, on the other hand, was addressed by conducting an AEC test, 
benchmarking the revenues from the undertaking’s parcel services to their incremental costs 
(additional costs solely stemming from the provision of the service in question).143 The AEC test 
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in the question of predatory pricing had to be implemented as it was established on the level of 
EU courts since the AKZO144 decision. 
 
3.1.3. La Poste 
La Poste, a Belgian public undertaking performing postal services, held a statutory postal 
monopoly in Belgium. The case in question deals with La Poste using its dominant position on 
the market of general mail services to wager a stronger foothold on the market of business-to-
business professional courier services. La Poste granted preferential tariffs in the area of 
business-to-private mail (where it was dominant) to one of its customers in return for a 
commitment amounting to a specified number of letters a year. The preferential tariffs have been 
cancelled by La Poste, this cancellation was revoked only after the customer in question signed 
an additional agreement of using a business-to-business service provided by La Poste. Based on 
the evidence available, the Commission concluded that La Poste abused its dominant position by 
using tying practices in the sense of Art. 102(d) TFEU – making the preferential tariffs in 
business-to-private mail conditional on entering supplementary obligations regarding business-
to-business mail.145 
The theory of harm seems to have held that the exclusionary practice of tying succeeded 
in reducing the market shares of its competitor the business-to-business services,146 thus 
weakening competition on the tied market. The main object of protection in this case thus seems 
to be competition as a process. 
As to the question of causal nexus, the Commission’s approach is form based in its 
essence. The headline above recital 73 of the decision goes so far as to say that tying between 
services covered by a monopoly and services open to competition always have repercussions on 
competition. The Commission does mention consistently dropping market shares of La Poste’s 
competitor as an effect of the dominant undertaking’s conduct, but this analysis lacks the use of 
an appropriate counterfactual that would show that there would be no such effect observable in 
the absence of the dominant undertaking’s conduct. 
 
3.1.4. Michelin 
Perhaps the most influential infringement decision issued in 2001 was the one in the case 
of the tyre manufacturer Michelin. The relevant product markets in question were the ones for 
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replacement tyres and retreaded tyres (the latter refers to worn off tyres whose casing is good 
enough to allow them to be refurbished). Michelin has put into place an intricate system of 
rebates applicable to its distributors on the given markets. Its three main components under 
investigation were (1) the general price conditions for France for professional dealers, (2) the 
agreement for optimum use of Michelin truck tyres and (3) the agreement on business 
cooperation and assistance services. After analysis of the rebate scheme in question, the 
Commission found Michelin to have abused its dominant position by applying loyalty inducing 
rebates to dealers in new replacement tyres and retreaded tyres for trucks and buses in France.147 
The discussion of the conduct’s possible effects seems to point to two objects of 
protection: market integration and competition as a process. The market integration is claimed to 
be compromised by the conduct’s market partitioning effect.148 Competition as a process is 
supposed to be compromised by restricting the buyers’ freedom to choose their sources of supply 
and thus hamper market entry of other competitors.149 
The method of assessment seems to be purely form based. The Commission claims that 
the scrutinised conduct has anti-competitive effects (see above). Nonetheless, the Commission’s 
reasoning refrains to a hypothetical discussion of possible incentives without much backing in 
empirical findings or economic theory. 
The Commission’s decision was contested by Michelin before the General Court. The 
General Court upheld the Commission’s decision.150 Perhaps most importantly (in relation to the 
seriousness of the abuse and the related fine), the General Court agreed that the Commission did 
not substantiate existence of any specific effects of the abusive practices, while the ones 
mentioned appeared rather speculative. This was not considered necessary by the General Court, 
as the seriousness of the infringement was established by reference to the nature and the object 
of the abusive conduct.151 
The General Court’s decision was not well accepted, Hans Zenger and Mike Walker 
point to the fact that although the rebates in question could have arguably some loyalty inducing 
effect, the fact that the scale of rebates consisted of 47 steps152 meant that missing one step 
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would generally lead to a loss of about 0.06% of the distributor’s expenditures, on its own hardly 
being able to lead to the detrimental effects as grave as hinted by the Commission.153 
 
3.2. Year 2003 
In 2003, there were three cases concerning infringement of Art. 102 TFEU. They were 
held against Deutsche Telekom, the German telecommunications operator, Ferovie dello Stato, 
the Italian railway operator, and Wanadoo, a French internet company. 
 
3.2.1. Deutsche Telekom 
Deutsche Telekom was the German telecommunications operator providing both 
wholesale access to local loops (the physical circuits connecting end users to the network)154 and 
retail services facilitating access to both narrowband (phone and ISDN connections) and 
broadband (ADSL connections). According to the Commission’s findings, Deutsche Telekom 
was dominant on all of these markets. After comparing the prices set for wholesale and retail 
customers, the Commission concluded that Deutsche Telekom has abused its dominant position 
on the relevant markets for direct access to its fixed telephone network in form of a margin 
squeeze.155 
The object of protection in this case seems to fall out of the consumer welfare criterion by 
claiming to defend competition as a process. In the section concerning effect on competition,156 
although the Commission contends that it is not bound to do so, it nonetheless argues that the 
dominant undertaking’s margin squeeze barred potential competitors from entering the market. It 
neither explicitly tests for anti-competitive foreclosure, nor it seems to apply any other kind of 
welfare standard. 
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Method wise, the Commission has undertaken to test whether the conduct in question was 
capable to foreclose an as-efficient-competitor.157 The Commission has compared a weighted 
average of retail prices to Deutsche Telekom’s wholesale charges to come to a conclusion that it 
would not be able to earn a profit on its retail services if it had to incur the costs of its own retail 
charges.158 As to the declared foreclosure, the Commission has thus used empirical methods 
based on price data to test a relevant counterfactual. It also concludes that the conduct barred 
access to the market. Although the appealingly looking findings about falling market shares of 
competitors and sluggish development of competition on the relevant markets are not 
methodologically rigorous (the do not pay much attention to proof of causality), the decision can 
be considered to generally apply a very simple effects-based benchmark. 
This decision was contested in court. The General Court has upheld the Commission’s 
decision. Regarding the question of effects, it explored the Commission’s assessment to come to 
the conclusion, that although the Commission erroneously claimed it was not necessary to 
demonstrate existence of an anti-competitive effect, it correctly identified barriers to entry to be 
the relevant effect for a newly liberalised market. It agreed with the Commission’s market 
analysis concerning the development of market shares and rejected Deutsche Telekom’s 
argument using the comparison to less competitive markets in other Member States.159 
Deutsche Telekom appealed to the Court of Justice, but to no effect.160 Regarding the 
question of the conduct’s effects, the Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s conclusion that 
an anti-competitive effect has to be demonstrated.161 The apparent lack of a counterfactual in 
relation to the Commission’s (and the General Court’s) finding concerning the barriers to entry 
was perhaps the reason why Deutsche Telekom argued that the General Court did not conclude 
that there was a causal relation between the margin squeeze and the competitors’ low market 
shares. The Court of Justice rejected this interpretation of the General Court’s judgement and, 
perhaps more importantly, relied on the fact that Deutsche Telekom did not provide evidence to 
the contrary.162 It would thus seem that a theory of anti-competitive harm in margin squeeze 
cases (without evidence to the contrary) merely requires establishment of a margin squeeze and a 
simultaneous deterioration of competition on the relevant market. It is worth mentioning that, as 
pointed out by AG Mazák’s opinion in this case, it was enough to establish potential effect on 
competition. This was also supposed to be done by the General Court’s conclusion that the 
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margin squeeze would, in principle, hamper competition because of the indispensability of 
Deutsche Telekom’s services.163 I would argue that this, while correct at least as to the 
sufficiency of proving possible/likely effects, should still enable the alleged perpetrator to defend 
itself by impugning the question of a causal link between the conduct and its alleged actual 
effects. A correct analysis based on an appropriate counterfactual should be able to disperse 
concerns about both actual and likely harm, if none is present. 
Furthermore, if the Commission opts to use evidence of growing market shares of the 
dominant undertaking as evidence supporting its position, it should put forward evidence as to a 
causal link between the growth and the conduct. Otherwise it seems hard to claim that actual 
effect has been proven on the basis of a faithful and correct analysis. 
 
3.2.2. Ferrovie dello Stato 
The German railway company Georg Verkehrsorganisation GmbH has filed a complaint 
against the Italian national railway carrier Ferrovie dello Stato for not allowing it to access 
Italian infrastructure and to form an international grouping. This prevented the complainant from 
providing international railway transport between Germany and Italy, as so called ‘international 
groupings’ were under then-effective provisions of EU law the only way for a railway 
undertaking to be able to access to passenger railway transport in another Member State. The 
Commission has concluded that Ferrovie dello Stato has thus abused its dominant position on the 
Italian market for passenger rail transport by denying the complainant the formation of an 
international grouping for the purposes of establishing an international rail passenger service 
(and thus denied access to its essential facility in form of the Italian national railway system).164 
The decision in question is clearly consistent with the object of market integration, where 
the conduct in question clearly restricted international railway passenger services between 
Germany and Italy. In this respect, the Commission concluded in general that Ferrovie dello 
Stato foreclosed competition in international rail passenger transport,165 competition as a process 
thus also appears to be pertinent in the Commission’s reasoning. Method wise, the assessment is 
purely form-based, devoid of any specific analysis of the actual and/or likely effects of the 
dominant undertaking’s conduct. This makes sense in relation to the clear result of barring 
potential competitors by not allowing access to an essential facility, one cannot infer the impact 
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on welfare or any more general repercussions within the economy of the internal market on the 
basis of such an analysis, though. 
 
3.2.3. Wanadoo 
Wanadoo was a subsidiary of France Télécom, a French telecommunications company, 
and functioned inter alia as an internet service provider in France. Its provision of ADSL is 
pertinent to this decision. In the early 2000s, Wanadoo was introducing ADSL internet on the 
French market while sustaining heavy losses amounting to tens of percent of its yearly turnover. 
The Commission found that Wanadoo’s revenues were far below its adjusted variable costs in 
part of 2001 (the cost issues continuing as far as into 2002), thus failing the AKZO predation test. 
Thus, it abused its dominant position on the French market of high-speed internet access.166 
In the entirety of the (relatively robust) section on the repercussions of the abuse in 
question,167 the main concern seems to be the elimination of competitors and securing a 
dominant position on a market with a new service. The Commission thus openly protects 
competition as a process without explicitly considering consumer welfare considerations. 
As to the Commission’s method of identifying an abuse, the approach is clearly effects-
based. In the lengthy section on the effects of the conduct, it describes the evolution of the 
number of subscribers of Wanadoo and its competitors and the development of market shares of 
the market participants. Throughout the assessment, the Commission relies heavily on economic 
literature to substantiate its points. Crucially, the empirical analysis of the market trends is 
accompanied by an interpretation of these market trends.168 Here, the Commission explains at 
some length why the observed trends could not be explained by factors other than the dominant 
undertaking’s abusive conduct. By doing this, it openly addressed the question of causality 
between the conduct and its actual effects. Indeed, as far as an effects-based analysis goes, the 
Commission’s Wanadoo case is one of the most advanced cases of its period in this respect. 
The decision was unsuccessfully challenged in court.169 As regards the question of 
effects, the General Court addresses them in paragraphs 259 to 267 of its judgement, although it 
mainly only reiterates the arguments put forward by the Commission and agrees with its 
conclusions. The General Court’s decision was further challenged before the Court of Justice, 
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also unsuccessfully.170 The decision does not further deliberate on the question of the conduct’s 
effects. 
 
3.3. Year 2004 
In 2004, there were two Art. 102 TFEU prohibition decisions. One against the 
Clearstream group, the German provider of clearing and settlement regarding securities. The 
other one was held against Microsoft, the US based IT company. 
3.3.1. Clearstream 
Clearstream group was responsible for clearing, settlement and custody services related 
to securities on the German market, having the function of a so called ‘Central Securities 
Depository.’ It ran the CASCADE system, a computerised platform for entry and matching of 
settlement instructions for stock exchange and over-the-counter transactions. CASCADE RS was 
part of this system, designed for handling registered shares (shares held by the issuer, as opposed 
to bearer shares). According to the Commission, Clearstream has abused its dominant position 
on the market of provision of primary clearing and settlement services for securities issued 
according to German law by refusing to provide direct access to the CASCADE RS system and 
by applying discriminatory prices for these services.171 
In the Clearstream case, the Commission claims that consumers were harmed by the 
conduct in question.172 The barring of access to primary clearing and settlement services was 
claimed to have resulted in competitors’ inability to provide efficient and innovative services on 
the downstream market.173 From harm to efficiency, one can infer reduction of welfare, the case 
thus falls into the group of welfare justifications. The conduct in question was also supposed to 
restrain cross-border trade, the prohibition was therefore also consistent with the goal of market 
integration.174 
The decision’s method of establishing an abuse is largely form-based. Both the refusal to 
supply and the price discrimination seem to be established by virtue of their very nature. The 
Commission does claim the dominant undertaking’s conduct had an anti-competitive nature. 
This is mainly substantiated by the observation that intermediaries (Clearstream’s downstream 
competitors) cannot opt for indirect access as a viable alternative. For these purposes, it lists 
reasons why it is harder/costlier to access the downstream market of intermediation without 
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direct access to the CASCADE RS system.175 I would argue that this suffices to show that the 
conduct made access to the downstream market more difficult, the actual or potential welfare loss 
(the existence of which the Commission opted to claim in this case) on the downstream market 
then seems to be considered to implicitly follow from the above finding. As the Commission 
states itself, though, it is not efficient for certain intermediaries to use local agents (indirect 
access) to provide their services. A more thorough explanation of the actual or potential effects 
on the market as such, not only some of Clearstream’s competitors, would seem in place to 
conclude, that the Commission’s analysis was truly effects-based. 
The Clearstream decision was challenged in court.176 As to the abuse and its effects, the 
General Court took the then-common approach of stating that its review of the Commission’s 
complex economic appraisals had to be limited.177 When assessing the question of effect as such, 
the General Court mainly repeats the arguments made by the Commission. Interestingly, it 
refutes Clearstream’s argument that the relatively small volume of shares and, disputedly, the 
volume of transactions carried out with respect to its competitor, should play a role in 
establishing a possible anti-competitive effect. Even a small number of transactions in registered 
shares can justify direct access to [Clearstream’s] system of processing.178 The General Court 
links this to the importance to be able to trade with German registered shares. In my opinion, the 
pertinent part of the judgement can also be read as the General Court’s rejection to apply an 
appreciability threshold to the effect of an abuse where Clearstream probably was not dominant 
(the market of intermediaries). 
 
3.3.2. Microsoft 
Microsoft, an IT company producing operating systems and other software, was selling 
its client PC operating systems accompanied by its product Windows Media Player, a software 
designed for playing media content. The Commission held that Microsoft has abused its 
dominant position on the market for client PC operating systems by not providing 
interoperability information for work group networks to other group server operating system 
vendors and making the availability of its client PC operating system conditional on 
simultaneously obtaining Windows Media Player.179 
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The Commission claimed that Microsoft’s conduct regarding the refusal to supply 
interoperability information180 and tying of Windows Media Player181 hampers innovation and 
diminishes consumers’ choice. The theory of harm in the decision thus clearly aims at protection 
of consumers, albeit rather in the long run, having dynamic efficiency of the market in mind. 
The Commission also has at least undertaken to prove that there are potential detrimental 
effects of Microsoft’s conduct. This follows from the abovementioned, as well as from the fact 
that the Commission claimed to have found a causal link between the dominant undertaking’s 
conduct and its increasing market share182 or that it found a reasonable likelihood that tying 
Windows Media Player with the Windows operating system would lead to a reduction in the 
degree of competition even though it acknowledges that it, and the EU courts, understood tying 
to have a foreclosing effect by its very nature in classical cases.183 
When contested before the General Court, the decision on the existence of an abuse of 
dominant position as such was upheld.184 Regarding Microsoft’s refusal to supply, the General 
Court ruled that the Commission should rely on accurate, reliable and coherent evidence which 
comprises all the relevant data that must be taken into consideration in order to assess a 
complex situation and which are capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from them. 
This finding is essentially substantiated by a reference to the General Court’s earlier case that 
brought a more effects-based approach into the area of merger regulation.185 Its analysis of the 
conduct’s effects was quite lengthy, spanning over paras 565 to 620 and 976 to 1090 of the 
decision. Thus, the General Court’s review of anti-competitive effects was comparably quite 
thorough in the case at hand. 
 
3.4. Year 2005 
The single Art. 102 TFEU prohibition decision issued in 2005 was the one against Astra, 
a pharmaceutical company involved in the invention and development of new drugs, inter alia 
Losec, a proprietary medicinal product devised to treat gastrointestinal acid-related conditions. 
According to the Commission, it has acted in breach of Art. 102 TFEU by (1) providing 
misleading representation before patent offices in various EU and EEA Member States and (2) 
by requesting surrender of market authorisations for Losec capsules and replacing Losec 
capsules by Losec MUPS tablets on the markets of some of the EU and EEA Member States. Put 
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shortly, Astra abused mechanisms of intellectual property law to prevent and/or hamper entry of 
generic producers who would compete against Losec after the expiry of the patent that protected 
it.186 
In relation to the first abuse (misleading patent offices to prolong the period of 
protection), the Commission clearly spells out the claim that providing national patent offices 
with misleading information in order to prolong the period of protection for Losec prevented 
market entry and, what is more, delayed the market preparations of generic medicament 
producers.187 The existence of a foreclosing effect of a legal barrier is quite clear, as well as the 
causality established by the Commission. Therefore, the analysis in this case seems to take the 
effect of the conduct sufficiently into consideration. 
Moreover, the Commission establishes the existence of effects on national health systems 
as well as direct harm to consumers. The conduct was supposed to lead to higher prices of the 
drug in question, thus increasing the costs incurred by consumers both indirectly as taxpayers 
and directly as participants in national co-payment medical systems.188 A similar conclusion was 
achieved by the Commission in relation to the second abuse (withdrawal of registration 
foreclosing and/or slowing down entry of generics and parallel imports), where this also was 
supposed to have the effect of increasing costs of national health systems and consumers.189 
 
3.5. Year 2006 
In 2006, there was also only one prohibition decision issued by the Commission. It was 
taken against Tomra, an undertaking in the business of beverage container collection. 
Specifically, Tomra produced so called reverse vending machines – devices used to accept 
empty beverage containers. Suspicions arose in connection to some of the agreements it entered 
with its customers. The problematic agreements contained clauses (1) making Tomra an 
exclusive supplier, (2) imposing individual quantity thresholds for customers and (3) loyalty 
inducing rebates. The Commission concluded that Tomra has abused its dominant position on 
the national reverse vending machine markets by following an exclusionary strategy consisting 
of exclusivity agreements, individualized quantity commitments and individualized retroactive 
rebate schemes.190 
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The Commission builds its case on the restriction of market access after conducting a 
detailed analysis of Tomra’s agreements, it also puts forward some arguments against the 
counterfactual scenario proposed by Tomra, according to which the competitors would be in the 
same situation regardless of the conduct in question.191 Thus, the Commission certainly 
attempted to establish causality based on the evidence it had, at least in relation to market 
foreclosure. The decision thus contains an analysis of the effects, but it seems to aim only at 
establishing foreclosure as such. In the entire decision, the question of harm to consumers is 
mentioned only the context of repeating the basic case law of EU case law on the notion of abuse 
of dominant position.192 Even though the Commission’s economic analysis was present, it was 
subject to considerable critique for effectively establishing a criterion nearly impossible to pass 
by any kind of loyalty rebate scheme.193 In any event, it may be concluded that some, perhaps 
faulty, economic analysis was present in the decision. 
The decision was unsuccessfully contested both before the General Court194 and the 
Court of Justice.195 The question of the conduct’s capability to foreclose competition (effect) 
and, specifically, the alleged per se nature of the rule applied by the Commission was addressed 
in paragraphs 206 to 230 of the General Court’s decision. The General Court agreed that all the 
circumstances of the case had to be taken into account196 (not just the contractual provisions per 
se). This was done by the Commission showing how the conduct could and, going beyond what 
was required of it, did affect and foreclose competition.197 Thus, the General Court upheld the 
substance of the Commission’s reasoning with all of its possible faults and shortcomings. 
The Court of Justice, too, upheld the decision in its entirety. Interestingly, it rejected 
Tomra’s arguments about the General Court’s failure to identify a threshold of affected market 
share that should lead to a conclusion about an abuse.198 This can be viewed as one of the 
instances, where the Court of Justice rejected application of a de minimis criterion to abuse of 
dominance, followed later by Post Danmark II.199 Another possible way to take into account the 
effect’s magnitude would be to have it addressed in a distinction between (in itself 
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unproblematic) direct harm to some competitors and (unlawful) harm to competition and/or 
consumers. The Court did not choose to follow this line of reasoning, however. 
Interestingly, while the Court of Justice refrained from making stronger statements on the 
question of anti-competitive effects as such, AG Mazák provided a strong endorsement for this 
approach to analysis of competition cases in his opinion.200 The reference to negative (anti-
competitive) effects should clearly not be mechanical.201 
 
3.6. Year 2007 
In 2007, there was also only one Art. 102 TFEU prohibition decision. It targeted 
Telefónica, a Spanish telecommunications operator. Telefónica provided both broadband internet 
to end-users and wholesale access for broadband internet suppliers. The Commission has found 
that Telefónica’s retail prices and wholesale access prices on the regional level were not 
sufficient to cover the costs that an operator as efficient as itself would incur. Consequently, the 
Commission concluded that it has infringed Art. 102 TFEU by applying unfair tariffs in the form 
of disproportion between its wholesale and retail broadband access prices between September 
2001 and December 2006.202 
Based on an analysis of the prices and costs of Telefónica, the Commission claimed that 
it was likely that the conduct would provide an obstacle to the continued presence of equally 
efficient competitors on the market,203 openly relying on economic theory to some extent.204 
Moreover, it puts forward empirical evidence of actual harm that was caused by the conduct. It 
does not confine itself to a simple description of the market trends (that could be caused both by 
the conduct as well as by other factors) but attempts to explain the causality between the conduct 
and its effect, for example by showing how narrowband presence did translate into higher 
broadband revenues for Telefónica but not for its competitor France Telecom which was 
dependant on its wholesale access. A competitor called ONO was not dependant on Telefónica in 
this respect and did not suffer of this effect.205 The analysis was thus clearly effects-based. 
Moreover, the Commission argues that the conduct led to direct harm to consumers by increasing 
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retail prices while simultaneously lowering broadband penetration.206 Protection was thus clearly 
aimed at consumers, applying a consumer welfare standard. 
Telefónica contested the Commission’s decision before the General Court to no 
success.207 The question of the assessment of effects and the relevant benchmark is addressed in 
paragraphs 266 to 284. In relation to the probability of effects taking place, the General Court 
refused to apply the in all likelihood standard that it applied in merger cases with the argument, 
that the a posteriori analysis of abuse of dominance has usually more evidence available for 
assessment. The a priori analysis in merger cases should be, on the contrary, carried out with 
greater care because of its intrinsically uncertain nature.208 Thus, the Commission’s decision was 
tested against a lower benchmark of tendency to restrict competition and found sufficient in this 
respect.209 
Telefónica’s appeal against the General Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of 
Justice.210 Paragraphs 102 to 125 of the judgement are dedicated to the question of effects of the 
conduct. The Court of Justice mostly simply agrees with the General Court’s assessment. 
Notably, it addresses the question of whether the General Court’s analysis of the margin squeeze 
should have encompassed the question of (non-)essentiality of the inputs, as supposedly followed 
from the judgement of the Court of Justice in TeliaSonera. The Court of Justice made clear, that 
essentiality may certainly be relevant but does not form an obligatory part of the analysis.211 
 
3.7. Year 2009 
In 2009, the only Art. 102 TFEU prohibition decision issued by the Commission was the 
one against Intel. The case of Intel was the first one issued after the Commission’s Guidance 
Paper has been published, supposedly aimed to follow the Commission’s newly declared 
enforcement methods and priorities. Intel is a major American producer of computer processors 
(CPUs). In that case, the alleged abuse in question was the application of, often exclusivity 
based, or de facto exclusivity based, loyalty inducing rebates as well as payments to customers in 
the area of x86 CPUs. The Commission has concluded, that Intel has indeed abused its dominant 
position by applying the rebates in question.212 
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The Commission’s position in the case is a peculiar one. Loyalty inducing rebates have 
been historically quite strictly regulated in EU competition law, effectively seen presumptively 
unlawful, following the judgement in Hoffmann-La Roche.213 The Commission opens its analysis 
by claiming, that it does not have to prove that the conduct is capable of or likely to cause anti-
competitive foreclosure.214 Then, nonetheless, it follows by running an as-efficient-competitor 
test to demonstrate the likelihood of foreclosure.215 It even includes a passage on the question of 
restriction of consumer choice and an explanation of how this restriction actually results in 
consumer harm, followed by arguments as to how would the competitive landscape be distorted 
in the future because of Intel’s conduct.216 Thus, the Commission has applied an effects-based 
analysis focused on consumers, though criticized by some for being flawed methodologically 
and being merely theoretical in some parts,217 while simultaneously claiming it was not in fact 
necessary. 
Intel brought an action for annulment against this decision to no success.218 The General 
Court put forward several contentious arguments in its assessment. To focus on two, it argued 
that (1) the Commission did not have to take all the circumstances of the case into account and 
(2) that it would not review the as-efficient-competitor test carried out in the case. First, it splits 
rebate systems into three categories: prima facie neutral quantity rebates,219 forbidden 
exclusivity rebates220 and a third category of rebates with a fidelity building effect.221 From an 
analysis of relevant case law it then comes to the conclusion that it is not necessary to take all the 
circumstances of the case into account, when it comes to exclusivity rebates, like the ones in the 
case at hand.222 Second, the question of the relevance of the as-efficient-competitor test for the 
case was addressed in paragraphs 140 to 166. The General Court argues, relying heavily on its 
judgement in the case of Tomra, that an as-efficient-competitor test is not necessary to 
demonstrate anti-competitive effects, even if assessment of all the circumstances of the case was 
to be carried out.223 One of the General Court’s arguments was that an as-efficient-competitor 
test is important for price based abuses (like margin squeezes or predatory pricing) because, 
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unlike loyalty inducing incentives, a pricing strategy has to be compared to a relevant benchmark 
to determine its abusiveness.224 
The General Court’s decision was subject to considerable critique,225 it applied a very 
strict and formal approach to the analysis of the rebate scheme, stretching the contemporary case 
law toward a very form-based interpretation, at least as regards the question of rebate schemes of 
dominant undertakings. Indeed, the Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s decision in its 
2017 grand chamber judgement.226 The Court of Justice, stating that the old case law on loyalty 
rebates had to be further clarified, came to the conclusion that the conducts capability to produce 
anti-competitive effects has to be examined by the Commission when this argument is put 
forward in the administrative procedure by the dominant undertaking if backed by credible 
evidence (thus refuting the inescapable per se unlawfulness of ‘exclusivity’ rebates, as put 
forward by the General Court).227 Moreover, the General Court erred by not examining the 
Commission’s as-efficient-competitor test, as it formed an important part of the Commission’s 
analysis of capability to produce anti-competitive effects.228 The case was referred back to the 
General Court where it is currently pending.229 The judgement seems to be a confirmation of the 
Court’s acceptance of a more effects-based approach in an area that has been one of the most 
resiliently focused on form. Some caution is in place though. As explained e.g. by James Venit, 
the judgement can be read in a purely procedural sense: The General Court erred when it did not 
address the applicant’s arguments concerning the as-efficient-competitor test. The substantive 
meaning of the outcome of the as-efficient-competitor test can still have little to no relevance to 
the decision on the abusiveness of the conduct as such, if we accept this reasoning.230 
As demonstrated above, the Court of Justice otherwise makes explicit reference to the 
question of capability of producing anti-competitive effects and implicitly rejects many of the 
General Court’s positions as a matter of principle by doing so. I would argue that if the error of 
the General Court was indeed purely procedural, the Court of Justice would treat its positions 
more charitably. Nonetheless, it is a valid reading of the judgement that cannot be disregarded at 
this point in time. 
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3.8. Year 2011 
In 2011, the Commission issued one prohibition decision against the Polish 
telecommunications operator Telekomunikacja Polska, the only one that had a nation-wide fixed 
telephone network at the time of the decision. As was the case for other telecommunication 
companies after 2000, the conduct under scrutiny involved broadband internet access. But unlike 
the pricing issues that were problematic in the cases of Deutsche Telekom, Wanadoo or 
Telefónica, the Commission contended that Telekomunikacja Polska infringed Art. 102 TFEU 
by a refusal to supply its wholesale broadband products between 2005 and 2009.231 
The Commission’s analysis does pay attention to the effects of the conduct, dedicating a 
significant amount of attention to the impact on consumers, in both cases heavily relying on 
empirical data. It thus falls into the group of effects-based analyses and its analysis is focused on 
consumers. The refusal to supply in the present case consists of a multifaceted strategy of 
hampering access to the wholesale broadband access market,232 namely proposing unreasonable 
conditions in draft contracts, delaying negotiations, refusing network and subscriber line access 
and refusing access to information necessary for entry. The analysis of foreclosure effects as 
such consists inter alia of behavioural evidence, describing cases of providers who successfully 
entered the necessary agreements but did not act on them because the conditions/information 
obtained from Telekomunikacja Polska implied it would not be profitable.233 In the quantitative 
analysis, the Commission relies on the fact that Telekomunikacja Polska had high market shares 
but there were very low penetration rates of competitors in the relevant wholesale markets.234 As 
a matter of harm to consumers, the Commission claims that the conduct resulted in slower 
internet for higher prices in comparison to other member states.235 As noted by Damien Geradin 
and Ianis Girgenson, the Commission’s analysis in this case is rather simplistic and comparator 
based, lacking the work with more elaborate counterfactuals incorporated in models going 
beyond simple comparators.236 Despite this critique, it has to be noted that the Commission does 
argue in favour of causality between the market situation of the time and Telekomunikacja 
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Polska’s conduct. This distinguishes it e.g. form the Commission’s Deutsche Telekom decision 
which was described above. 
Telekomunikacja Polska did file an action for annulment against the Commission’s 
decision with the General Court only to withdraw it later on.237 The Commission’s decision thus 
remained uncontested. 
 
3.9. Year 2014 
There were four prohibition decisions concerning abuse of dominant position in 2014. 
They were taken against Servier, a pharmaceutical company, Motorola, an American 
telecommunications company and mobile phone producer, Slovak Telekom, a Slovak 
telecommunications company and Operatorul Pieței de Energie Electrică și de Gaze Naturale 
"OPCOM" S.A. (OPCOM), the single Romanian power exchange operator. The decision against 
Servier238 will not be addressed in detail in this work as it deals with a combined breach of Art. 
101 TFEU and Art. 102 TFEU and the requisite legal standard for the analysis of effects in Art. 
101 TFEU cases is outside the scope of this master’s thesis. 
 
3.9.1. Slovak Telekom 
Slovak Telekom was an incumbent telecommunications operator on the Slovak market. 
The Commission argued that, between mid-2005 and late 2010, Slovak Telekom (or, more 
precisely, an undertaking consisting of Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom) (1) withheld 
information necessary for alternative operators for the purposes of local loop unbundling, (2) 
reduced its obligations concerning unbundled loops, (3) set unfair terms in its unbundling offers 
and (4) applied unfair tariffs, thus excluding equally efficient competitors from wholesale access 
to its unbundled local loops. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that Slovak Telekom 
infringed on Art. 102 TFEU.239 
The Commission ran an as-efficient-competitor test to determine that a margin squeeze 
has taken place in the case at hand. Notably, it found that there was a period of about four 
months in 2005 where the margins were found actually positive (i.e. an equally efficient 
competitor would turn a profit). The Commission argued that these four months nonetheless 
constituted a breach, as no lasting entry can be made for such a short period of time.240 Further, 
the Commission’s assessment of quantitative and qualitative evidence proving the potential anti-
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competitive effects of the conduct is located in recitals 1110 to 1183 of the decision. It generally 
follows a similar pattern of comparing market shares and penetration rates as in against 
Telekomunikacja Polska. Commendably, it works more with general European trends instead of 
comparisons to selected Member States. The comparably more thorough analysis was probably 
caused by a more active defendant who proposed its own counterfactual analysis241 and claimed 
absence of prejudice to consumers,242 which the Commission both refuted in the decision. 
Consumer harm was established by the Commission using external international comparisons 
from sources like the OECD243 or Van Dijk Management Consultants.244 The analysis is thus 
does work with the effects of the conduct and does claim that direct consumer harm occurred. 
Slovak Telekom has filed an action for annulment against this decision and has been 
partially successful.245 In paragraphs 240 to 268 of the judgement, the General Court comes to 
the conclusion that the Commission has not proven an anti-competitive margin squeeze for the 
four months in 2005 where the period by period as-efficient-competitor test did not reveal any 
negative margins, as mentioned above. The reasoning is simple. Between August and December 
2005 (the contentious period), an equally efficient competitor was in principle able to compete 
against Slovak Telekom.246 The Commission bears the burden of proof as relates to potential 
anti-competitive effect, pursuant to Art. 2 of Regulation 1/2003.247 Although it certainly follows 
from EU competition law, that a conduct can be abusive even in the event of positive margins, 
the Commission has failed to demonstrate that this was the case in its decision.248 It does not 
happen that often for the General Court to find that the Commission failed to prove likely anti-
competitive effects to the requisite standard, be it only in such restricted scope. As the remainder 
of the action was dismissed, Slovak Telekom appealed to the Court of Justice.249 The case is 
currently pending. It will be interesting to see how the Court of Justice will approach the issue. 
 
3.9.2. OPCOM 
OPCOM is a market operator of the Romanian power exchange who facilitates short-term 
trading of electricity between producers and wholesale providers. In the Day-Ahead and Intraday 
markets, OPCOM required all the participants to be registered for VAT in Romania (and 
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consequently have to establish business premises in the country). This was discriminatory 
treatment that has, according to the Commission, amounted to a breach of Art. 102 TFEU 
committed by an undertaking consisting of OPCOM and its parent company, Compania 
Națională de Transport al Energiei Electrice "Transelectrica" S.A.250 
The theory of harm put forward by the Commission251 is relatively simple. As the 
requirement of VAT registration constitutes a barrier to entry, it reduces liquidity on the 
wholesale electricity market. The Commission substantiates this by examples of traders who 
were barred from joining the power exchange.252 Inefficient pricing will result in an increased 
risk of inefficient investment and a related risk of unnecessarily high prices for consumers.253 To 
establish a benchmark for possible entry in the event of dropping the VAT requirement, the 
Commission made a simple comparator-based analysis of ‘comparable’ markets. Thus, the 
Commission does infer likely effects of the conduct as well as its repercussions for consumer 
welfare, even though the analysis as such is rather simple in the present case. It must be noted 
that the goal of market integration also strongly resonates in this case as the conduct presents a 
clear restriction of access for entities from other Member States. 
 
3.9.3. Motorola 
In this case, the contentious conduct was Motorola enforcing one of its standard essential 
patents related to the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) standard used in mobile telephony. 
Interestingly, Motorola simply sought for and later enforced a court injunction against Apple 
who made use of its patent on the German market, generally a legitimate instrument of 
protection of intellectual property rights. The Commission’s contention was that while Motorola 
has vouched to license the patent on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and 
Apple was willing to be a licensee, its otherwise legitimate behaviour was not compatible with 
Art. 102 TFEU. Because of the specific nature of the infringement, however, the Commission 
did not impose a fine on Motorola and simply ordered it to bring the anti-competitive conduct to 
an end.254 
The basis of the Commission’s theory of harm consists of two main considerations: (1) 
the worsening of Apple’s position as such and (2) the negative effect on future standard setting. 
As for the first consideration, the Commission underlines the fact that Apple was temporarily 
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barred from online sales of its GPRS compatible products on the German market and forced to 
accept disadvantageous licensing terms.255 The Commission’s logic seems to be that Motorola 
used the indispensability of its patent to significantly worsen the competitive position of its rival. 
This did not constitute competition on the merits (and was thus unlawful) because Motorola did 
not act in accordance with its commitment to license its patent under FRAND terms. More 
generally, the Commission states that it is beneficial for the industry and consumers to be able to 
successfully contest the validity of the patent (which was not possible pursuant to the conditions 
in the case at hand). Otherwise, unnecessarily high prices may be passed on to consumers.256 
Concerning the second consideration, standards are key for technical development in hi-tech 
industries like telephony.257 Therefore, access to the essential patents is necessary for a healthy 
competitive landscape in such industries. The Commission thus does examine the effective 
repercussions of the conduct and bares consumer welfare in mind. 
The theory of harm in this case is relatively abstract. As follows from the Commission’s 
reasoning, one of the key questions will be to determine if the dominant undertaking’s terms 
were FRAND – this may leave quite a broad interpretative margin. This issue was not challenged 
in an action for annulment, but it was further clarified by the Court of Justice by means of a 
preliminary ruling.258 There, it was made clear that a dominant undertaking, holding a standard 
essential patent, can bring and action against alleged infringers of its intellectual property rights 
if (1) it first resorts to prior notice or consultation. If the alleged infringer is willing to cooperate, 
it (2) presents a specific written offer of a licensing agreement under FRAND terms. If the 
alleged infringer disputes the fairness of the proposed agreement and still wants to rely on the 
abusive nature of the action, (3) it has to promptly submit a written and specific counter-offer to 
the proprietor of the patent.259 Moreover, the Court of Justice specifies, in line with the 
Commission’s abovementioned theory of harm, that the alleged infringer cannot be criticised for 
challenging the validity of the patents in question.260 This sets quite clear procedural conditions 
reconciling patent protection and requirements of competition law. The question of assessment 
of anti-competitive harm in similar future cases seems to be confined to the estimation of 
fairness (‘FRANDness’, to be more specific) supposing compliance with the abovementioned 
criteria by both parties in question. 
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3.10. Year 2016 
The Commission has issued one prohibition decision in 2016. It was aimed at Altstoff 
Recycling Austria Aktiengesellschaft (ARA), an Austrian company that collects and recycles 
packaging of goods on behalf of other companies, thus fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities 
under Austrian law on their behalf. ARA as such controlled and partly owned the household 
collection infrastructure for lightweight and metal packaging waste. According to the 
Commission, ARA has abused its dominant position on the relevant market for the exemption of 
household packaging waste by barring access to this infrastructure for potential competitors.261 
One of the key remarks of the Commission is the fact that the infrastructure controlled by 
ARA cannot be duplicated.262 It is thus an indispensable input.263 Therefore, having concluded 
that a refusal to supply has occurred,264 the refusal has led to a likely elimination of competition, 
as ARA’s agreement to supply was a necessary condition for market entry, given the 
circumstances.265 The decision’s argumentation concerning anti-competitive effects is quite 
sparse, the Commission explicitly mentions that it is not necessary to establish causality between 
ARA’s conduct and the inability to enter the market on part of some potential competitors in 
response to ARA’s claims, that they were not able to enter the market regardless of its 
conduct.266 Thus it does not seem to fulfil the Commission’s usual benchmark of an effects-
based analysis in a prohibition decision. The question of consumer harm is not addressed at all. 
The sparseness of the analysis of effects and the short length of the decision as such can 
be possibly explained by the fact that ARA has decided to cooperate and acknowledge the 
infringement, even propose structural remedies. This has led the Commission to reduce the fine 
imposed by 30%.267 As remarked by Peter Thyri,268 the decision seems to present a strange 
hybrid between an Art. 7 prohibition decision and an Art. 9 settlement (talking in terms of 
Regulation 1/2003269). While going beyond a simple decision on commitments, the Commission 
seems to have concluded that the bar of the requisite legal standard (for establishing likely 
effects, inter alia) was set lower than usual. 
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3.11. Year 2017 
There were two Art. 102 TFEU prohibition decisions issued by the Commission in 2017. 
The first one was aimed at AB Lietuvos geležinkeliai (LG), a Lithuanian railway undertaking 
and infrastructure manager, while the second one was the first of the three decisions aimed at 
Google, the American IT company. 
 
3.11.1. Baltic rail 
In the case of LG, the abusive conduct was based on a seemingly innocuous behaviour of 
the undertaking. In September 2008, it claimed to have detected a deformation of a segment of a 
railway track used to transport oil from a Lithuanian refinery to Latvia. According to the 
Commission, LG’s conduct led to an abuse of its dominant position on the Lithuanian market for 
management of railway, having potential anti-competitive effects on the downstream market of 
provision of rail transport services for oil products to the seaports of Klaipeda, Riga and 
Ventils.270 
The basic premise of the case is the Commission’s conclusion that it was not necessary 
and/or common practice to remove the track in question.271 Some of LG’s competitors were a 
credible alternative to LG’s services before the removal of the track,272 but lost their capacity to 
provide competitive constraints to LG after the removal of the track.273 This conduct has thus led 
to foreclosure of competitors.274 The Commission shows that the alternative route after the 
removal of the track is not a cost efficient alternative.275 Moreover, LG could benefit of 
information asymmetry stemming from the fact that it knew its national tracks very well, unlike 
potential competitors from abroad whose uncertainty as to the costs of transport has increased.276 
The Commission further corroborates these findings with evidence of actual failed negotiations 
that were most probably unsuccessful only because of the removal of the track.277 The analysis 
of both the scenario ensuing from the removal of the track as well as the counterfactual 
hypothetical position of a competitor able to make use of the track are analysed quite 
painstakingly. The analysis is thus effects-based even in face of a conduct that could be tempting 
to be condemned based on, at least apparently, malicious intent. The Commission does not 
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directly address the question of consumer harm, though, the assessment is thus confined to the 
foreclosure effect. LP has filed an action for annulment that is currently pending.278 
 
3.11.2. Google Shopping 
In the first of its three prohibition decisions against Google, the Commission focuses on 
Google’s comparison-shopping service and its placement next to the results of its general search 
engine. According to the Commission, Google holds a dominant position in the national markets 
for general search services. Allegedly using this dominant position to its advantage on a separate 
market, Google was found to act in breach of Art. 102 TFEU by positioning and displaying its 
comparison-shopping service more favourably than the competing services in the general search 
results.279 
As noticed by Giorgio Monti,280 one of the (perhaps contentious) assumptions 
underpinning the theory of harm in this concrete case is the claim that competitors should be able 
to compete for the entire market, not just for a part of it.281 Although such a claim certainly 
strengthens the Commission’s position later on, it remains questionable why this should be the 
case, especially when decisions such as the one against Intel normally operate with the 
distinctions of contestable and non-contestable shares of the market. Departing from this general 
consideration, the Commission contends that the combination of ranking of comparison-
shopping services in the general search results, the position and the graphical presentation of the 
Google shopping results together lead to a decrease of traffic from Google’s general search 
results page to competing comparison shopping services. Simultaneously, the conduct increases 
traffic to Google’s own comparison-shopping service.282 Subsequently, the Commission 
contends that the diversion caused by the conduct affects a ‘large proportion’ of traffic which 
cannot be effectively replaced by other means,283 without going so far to call the traffic from the 
general search results indispensable. 
Building on the above findings, the Commission concludes that the conduct has a 
potential to foreclose competing comparison-shopping services because of their artificially 
worsened position, while consumers will have a reduced ability to access the most relevant 
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comparison-shopping services.284 Even if the relevant market was found to include merchant 
platforms, the conduct would still be likely to produce anti-competitive effects.285 Finally, the 
preferential positioning of Google Shopping results should lead to higher revenues generated on 
general search services, thus producing likely anti-competitive effects on the markets for general 
search services.286 The Commission thus certainly does look at the effects and does take 
consumer welfare into account. 
Nonetheless, the decision was subjected to considerable critique. I would argue that most 
of it can be summed up in the contention that the Commission made little effort to spell out a 
legal standard for what constituted a breach in that case. In other words, what is the legal test? 
We can learn that the Bronner287 test should not be applied, according to the Commission.288 But 
can it be compared to tying in the case of Microsoft’s Windows Media Player by virtue of its 
similar effects?289 Or maybe anti-competitive discrimination against comparison shopping 
services?290 Or, has the Commission erred by failing to directly address the question of 
indispensability in a case of self-preferencing?291 
I believe the much of the current controversy is linked to the ‘legalistic’ leg of the theory 
of harm (‘the test’) which was discussed in Chapter 1. The Commission has shown that there has 
been some, probably quite significant, effect detrimental to competitors which was certainly not 
achieved by the quality of the product in question (i.e. not by competition on the merits). 
Therefore, I do not think it failed to run an analysis of the effects of conduct as such. On the 
contrary, it has done plenty of it. It failed to set a clear legal benchmark – many things a 
dominant undertaking can do will result in some harm to competitors. It is worth mentioning, 
that the Court of Justice has recently rules in a case of Art. 102(c) TFEU discrimination that the 
mere presence of an immediate disadvantage … does not mean that competition is distorted or is 
capable of being distorted.292 Even without a de minimis threshold, we need some way of telling, 
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where a worsened position of a competitor translates into a likely distortion of competition. The 
question of the requisite legal standard will likely be one of the issues solved by the General 
Court in the action for annulment filed by Google against this decision.293 
  
                                                 





4. Discussion of the Results 
 
4.1. General results 
There are several general tendencies that can be seen from the analysis of the 
Commission’s post-2000 case law. Remaining on the general methodological level described in 
Chapter 1, there is a clear trend in reasoning the decisions in a way that takes into account the 
conduct’s (likely) effects and explains how it impacts consumers. 
Only a quarter of decisions before 2009 (the year the Guidance Paper294 was published) 
contained a more serious analysis of effects and simultaneously took the consumer welfare 
standard into account. On contrary, three quarters of the prohibition decisions issued in 2009 or 
later did contain both. The Commission thus generally follows its soft law on unilateral conduct 
in some form. There are, of course, some notable exceptions. As late as in 2016 and 2017, the 
Commission did not adhere to it in its decisions ARA295 and Baltic Rail.296 Further, some of the 
cases did both focus on a value different than consumer welfare and did not seriously analyse the 
effects of the conduct. These cases fall almost exclusively297 into the early years of the new 
millennium. Their general focus often tends to be market integration rather than competition. 
The following table presents a brief overview of the results of the analysis of previous chapter. 
 
Case (year) Consumer welfare? Effects-based? 
Deutsche Post – mail (2001) YES NO 
Deutsche Post – parcel (2001) NO NO 
Michelin (2001) NO NO 
La Poste (2001) NO NO 
Deutsche Telekom (2003) NO YES 
Ferrovie dello Stato (2003) NO NO 
Wanadoo (2003) NO YES 
Clearstream (2004) YES NO 
Microsoft (2004) YES YES 
Astra (2005) YES YES 
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Tomra (2006) NO YES 
Telefónica (2007) YES YES 
Intel (2009) YES YES 
Telekomunikacja Polska (2011) YES YES 
Motorola (2014) YES YES 
Slovak Telekom (2014) YES YES 
Romanian Power Exchange (2014) YES YES 
ARA (2016) NO NO 
Baltic Rail (2017) NO YES 
Google Shopping (2017) YES YES 
 
The simple answer would thus be that the Commission does generally apply a consumer 
welfare standard tested against the likely effects of a conduct. This does not capture the whole 
picture, however. One question is, how thorough the Commission has to be? As early as in 2003, 
the Commission conducted a surprisingly in-depth analysis explicitly relying on economic 
reasoning applied to empiric data in Wanadoo.298 In the same year in a very similar case 
(problematic pricing practices in relation to broadband internet) the Commission explained the 
likely effects of the conduct in several recitals on a much more superficial level in Deutsche 
Telekom.299 Both decisions were contested in court and both were upheld. The takeaway seems 
to be, that while EU courts do agree that the Commission has to show likely anti-competitive 
effects of a conduct, the current threshold seems to be rather low. This is not improved by the 
fact that the question of degree of certainty required to prove likely anti-competitive effects in 
abuse of dominance cases has never been fully clarified by EU courts.300 
Thus, the Commission seems to currently have a significant margin of discretion in which 
it can and does chose how to perform the analysis of the effects of the conduct in question. In 
some cases, it is relatively thorough. In some it is not. One of the possible determinants that 
seem to play a role is how much of a fight is the dominant undertaking willing to put up. In high-
profile cases like Microsoft301 or Google Shopping,302 the Commission (despite the critique of 
some) seems to make an effort to explain the anti-competitive effects more thoroughly than 
usual. On the other hand, it can be very brief when the undertaking in question admits the anti-
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competitive nature of its conduct and decides to cooperate, as seen in ARA.303 While this 
approach seems sane on a procedurally-tactical level, such an approach can be problematic in the 
light of Art. 2 of Regulation 1/2003: It is the Commission who bears the burden of proof in 
relation to anti-competitive effects when issuing a prohibition decision. It makes little sense to 
conclude that some cases require ‘more proof’ than others based on factors other than the 
complexness of the subject matter. 
 
4.2. Specific questions 
There are several more specific areas that deserve to be addressed separately. This section 
provides a brief overview of some of these issues that can be seen in the Commission’s case law. 
 
4.2.1. Asymmetric counterfactuals 
The issue of asymmetric counterfactuals is linked to the question of the Commission’s 
burden of proof in relation to the conduct’s effects addressed in the previous section. As 
described in the first chapter, the proof of actual (or likely) abuse of dominance does implicitly 
rely on the idea of a counterfactual – if it was not for the abusive conduct, the competitive 
landscape and/or consumer welfare would be in a better condition (or less endangered). This idea 
also goes both ways as explained above. A thriving competitor of a dominant undertaking is not 
per se proof that the dominant undertaking’s conduct does not produce likely anti-competitive 
effects. Equally, growing sales and market shares of a dominant undertaking are not immediate 
proof of the abusiveness of the dominant undertaking’s conduct. In line with the first example, 
EU courts readily apply this counterfactual argument when dismissing the dominant 
undertaking’s claims. This happened in the General Court’s Intel judgement, where the growth 
of Intel’s competitor AMD during the alleged abuse was not considered as proof of a lack of 
likely anti-competitive effects.304 On the other hand, as discussed above in the case of Deutsche 
Telekom,305 the Commission can put forward evidence growing market shares (or dwindling 
competition) with little to no arguments concerning the causal relation between the conduct and 
the alleged effects without having this practice questioned by EU courts. A similar approach to 
the question of actual effects can be found in the ARA306 decision. 
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It is true that the Commission merely has to prove likely effects. This being said, the 
alleged actual effects do not seem to be immaterial. The Commission itself identifies them as a 
relevant factor for its decision making.307 Thus, at the current state of affairs, it seems that a 
growing market share of the dominant undertaking is a factor that can be used ipso facto as 
evidence against it, if present. If this factor is absent, the undertaking cannot rely on it, though. 
This is not to argue that the dominant undertaking should be able to build its defence on the mere 
fact that its conduct was not effective. Rather, it would seem reasonable in the light of Art. 2 of 
Regulation 1/2003308 to require the Commission to present arguments why the further decline of 
the competitive fringe was indeed caused by the dominant undertaking’s conduct, if it chooses to 
rely on such a finding.309 
 
4.2.2. The continuing tension between legal certainty and precision 
It is a delicate exercise to strike a balance between the requirement of legal certainty and 
accuracy in the enforcement of competition law. As explained by Jan Broulík, there is tension 
between the two values.310 In the analysed cases, there can be seen both those that seemed to err 
on the side of legal certainty as well as those that contained an abundant analysis of the practical 
repercussions of the conduct without establishing a tangible legal standard. The first category 
certainly contains the decisions on loyalty-inducing rebates like Michelin,311 or Tomra,312 a 
formal rule the future enforcement of which may evolve in the light of recent case law, as 
indicated above. The second category certainly entails cases like Motorola313 or Google 
Shopping.314 Both decisions do discuss the effects of the conduct without establishing much 
guidance for the future enforcement of similar situations. While it is commendable that the 
Commission can be quite thorough in its analysis of the conduct’s effects, I would argue that 
establishing a benchmark for a breach and why it was fulfilled is a necessity in order to provide 
future guidance, even if the decision presents a novel theory of harm. This is not to be interpreted 
as a retreat to a more form-based approach. Some of the better-established areas of abuse of 
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dominance, like predatory pricing or margin squeezes, regularly comprise of a generally 
accepted legal criterion (e.g. economically irrational pricing) and an explanation of the conduct’s 
likely effects.  
Another issue is the question of legal certainty with regards to the fine. In novel cases, the 
Commission has often decided not to impose a fine (or to impose a symbolic fine). This 
happened e.g. in Deutsche Post315 or Motorola.316 The Commission does not seem to be bound to 
do so in every case, as can be seen in the case of Google Shopping.317 
 
4.2.3. The Commission’s sporadic use of economic theory 
Next to empiric analyses, reliance on economic theory can be another way of increasing 
the persuasiveness of the Commission’s theory of harm. The Commission does not seem to rely 
on it in a consistent manner. Or less consistently and often, for that matter. Some of the cases 
that relied more heavily on the findings of economic theory were Wanadoo318 and Deutsche Post 
(parcel services).319 Both cases were based on theories of harm that were not particularly novel 
either legally or economically speaking. It may be harder to look for economic literature to 
underpin a theory of harm that is novel (though it may prove even more useful if it exists). 
Nonetheless, the Commission seems to refer to economic literature in exceptional cases 
regardless of the complexness or novelty of the theory of harm. More often, it employs common 
sense arguments concerning incentives and likely effects. 
Perhaps the Commission opts for its own arguments in favour of existence of likely anti-
competitive effects not to undermine the fact that the decision presents an authoritative 
interpretation of the law, not an academic text. Nonetheless, identifying economic ideas the 
decision relies on more explicitly could bring more transparency into the Commission’s theories 
of harm. If the economic theory relied upon is uncontroversial, it should not be problematic. If it 
is controversial, the Commission should even more so avoid shying away of that fact. 
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This master’s thesis undertook to analyse the Commission’s case law on unilateral anti-
competitive conduct from the last twenty years. Its goal was to examine how the Commission 
adhered to the application of the consumer welfare standard and effects-based approach before 
and after it formally vouched to build its theories of harm (in cases of exclusionary conduct) 
based on these two aspects. Moreover, it lined out the boundaries to the Commission’s theories 
of harm enacted by the case law of the General Court and the Court of Justice and pointed out 
some of the important decisions linked to the analysed Commission’s decisions. 
As a result, we can conclude that the Commission’s case law did shift to a more effects-
based approach over time and that the Commission does attempt to take the consumer welfare 
standard into account in some way in most of its decisions. Beyond this superficial result, there 
are some remaining issues, though. 
First, the EU courts have been historically lenient as to the standard the Commission has 
to adhere to in order to prove likely anti-competitive effects to the requisite legal standard. The 
courts’ review lacking a disciplining effect on the Commission, its depth and quality of analysis 
seems to differ case to case without any clear, legally or factually relevant reason. Similarly, the 
EU courts seem to readily accept alleged effects of a dominant undertaking’s conduct without 
having very high requirements for arguments in support of causality between the conducts and 
the perceived effect. On contrary, the courts can readily apply a counterfactual argument to a 
dominant undertaking’s argument vice versa. Thus, as the law stands, the Commission seems to 
have to provide relatively little proof as to the likely anti-competitive effects and it does make 
use of this fact on some occasions. 
Second, there is room for improvement in the clarity and transparency in the theories of 
harm advanced by the Commission. This could be done by relying more on economic theory 
when addressing anti-competitive effects and by always addressing the legal standard that was 
applied in the given case. 
I would argue that the analysis has also shown that, at the current state of affairs, it is 
indeed the Commission who has to push consistently for a more effects-based approach and the 
application of a consumer welfare standard in order to achieve tangible results. As can be seen 
above, some of the recent decisions of both the Court of Justice and the General Court provide 





relation to the application of a more effects-based approach, but it is too soon to make any far-
reaching conclusions. 
A possibility of a more sophisticated analysis of the Commission’s Art. 102 TFEU case 
law lies open for future research. A wider scope of Commission decisions can be taken into 
account, e.g. commitment decisions. On a methodological note, apart from the two general 
criteria applied in this master’s thesis, more specific questions can be asked. For example, if the 
Commission does examine the actual or likely effects of a given conduct, what was the 
underlying economic reasoning, what school of thought could it be attributed to? What economic 
school is it consistent with? A comparative analysis with case law from the USA could also be 
quite insightful, especially in cases that have been dealt with on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
Indeed, the application of Art. 102 TFEU seems to be constantly in flux. Its developmental 
possibilities and tendencies deserve to be thoroughly studied, especially in the ever-evolving 






List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AEC test as-efficient-competitor test 
AG Advocate General 
Commission European Commission 
EU European Union 
EU courts The Court of Justice and the General Court 
TEU Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 13–
388. 
TFEU Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, pp. 47-390 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 







List of Cited Resources 
 
1. List of Cited Literature 
AVERITT, Neil W. and LANDE, Robert H., 1997. Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason 
for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law [article]. Loyola Consumer Law Review. 
1997. No. Issue 1, p. 44. 
 
BERGQVIST, Christian. Google and the search for a theory of harm: The Commission has 
published its June 2017 Google decision, thus exposing it to scrutiny. While the work 
undertaken by the EU Commission is impressive and bold, much of the legal dimension of 
the decision bears discussion. Moreover, the case has been redacted significantly, thus 
leaving open the door for additional cases and fines. ECLR: European Competition Law 
Review. 2018, 2018(4), pp. 149–151.  
 
BISHOP, Simon and WALKER, Mike, 2010. The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement. Sweet & Maxwell. ISBN 978-0-421-93190-9.  
 
BOBEK, Michal and KÜHN, Zdeněk, 2013. Judikatura a právní argumentace. Auditorium. 
ISBN 978-80-87284-35-3. Google-Books-ID: EtRZngEACAAJ 
 
BORK, Robert H., 1993. Antitrust Paradox. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-02-904456-8.  
 
BROULÍK, Jan, 2019. Preventing anti-competitive conduct directly and indirectly: accuracy 
versus predictability. The Antitrust Bulletin. 2019. Vol. 64, no. 1, p. 115–127. 
  
DASKALOVA, Victoria. Consumer welfare in EU competition law: what is it (not) about? 
The Competition Law Review (2015). 2015, 11(1), 131–160. 
 
FIEBIG, Andre, 2004. Modernization of European Competition Law as a Form of 
Convergence. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 4 No. 6, July 2004. . 2004.  
 
GERADIN, Damien, 2010b. The Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel 
Case: Where is the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm? Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice. 2010. Vol. 1, no. 2, p. 112–122.  
 
GRAVELLE, H. S. E. and REES, Raymond, 1992. Microeconomics. Addison-Wesley 
Longman, Incorporated. ISBN 978-0-582-02386-4.  
 
GRAVELLE, Hugh and REES, Ray, 2004. Microeconomics. 3: e uppl. Harlow: Prentice 
Hall. 2004.  
 
HAHN, Robert W., 2003. High-Stakes Antitrust: The Last Hurrah? Brookings Institution 
Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-9612-1.  
 
HAWK, Barry E., 2009. International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 
2008. Juris Publishing, Inc. ISBN 978-1-57823-253-6.  
 







IPPOLITO, Pauline M., 1991. Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from 
Litigation. The Journal of Law and Economics. 1 October 1991. Vol. 34, no. 2, Part 1, p. 
263–294. DOI 10.1086/467226.  
 
JONES, Alison and SUFRIN, Brenda, 2016. EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-872342-4.  
 
KINDL, Jiří. Dohody narušující hospodářskou soutěž. Charles University, 2009. Disertation 
thesis supervisor: Stanislava Černá. 
 
MONTI, Giorgio, 2007. EC Competition Law. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-
521-70075-7.  
 
MOTTA, Massimo, 2004. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University 
Press. ISBN 978-0-521-01691-9.  
 
MUNKOVÁ, Jindřiška, 2012. Soutěžní právo. C.H. Beck. ISBN 978-80-7400-424-7.  
 
PETIT, Nicolas, 2018. The case of the European Commission’s curious interpretation of the 
Intel judgment. Competition Law & Policy Debate. February 2018. Vol. 4, no. 1, p. 98–101.  
 
PETR, Michal, 2010. Zakázané dohody a zneužívání dominantního postavení v ČR. Vyd. 1. 
V Praze: C. H. Beck. Beckova edice právní instituty. ISBN 978-80-7400-307-3.  
 
RICHARDSON, DAVID J. AUTOR, GRAHAM, GRAHAM, Edward Montgomery and 
RICHARDSON, J. David, 1997. Global Competition Policy. Peterson Institute. ISBN 978-
0-88132-166-1.  
 
SAMA, Danilo, 2012. The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU 
competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm. 
Available at SSRN 2425100. 2012. 
 
 
SAMUELSON, Paul A. and NORDHAUS, William D., 2009. Economics. 19th edition. 
Boston: McGraw-Hill Education. ISBN 978-0-07-351129-0.  
 
ŠMEJKAL, Václav, 2012. Ochrana spotřebitele a jeho blahobytu v soutěžním právu EU. 
Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Iuridica. 2012. P. 31–65. 
  
 
ŠMEJKAL, Václav, 2015a. Soutěžní politika a právo Evropské unie 1950-2015: vývoj, 
mezníky, tendence a komentované dokumenty. Vydání první. Praha: Leges. Teoretik. ISBN 
978-80-7502-108-3.  
 
STUCKE, Maurice, 2009. Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law The Antitrust 
Marathon: Antitrust and the Rule of Law - Discussion - Discussion. Loyola Consumer Law 






VENIT, James S, 2017. The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Intel v 
Commission: a procedural answer to a substantive question? European Competition Journal. 
2017. Vol. 13, no. 2–3, p. 172–198.  
 
VERHAERT, Joyce, 2014. The challenges involved with the application of article 102 
TFEU to the New Economy: A case study of Google. European Competition Law Review. 
June 2014. Vol. 35, no. 6, p. 265.  
 
WEITBRECHT, Andreas, 2011. From Freiburg to Chicago and beyond-The first 50 years of 
European competition law. RRDE. 2011. P. 79.  
 
WEITZEL, Tim, 2003. Economics of Standards in Information Networks. Springer Science 
& Business Media. ISBN 978-3-7908-0076-0. 
 
WHISH, Richard and BAILEY, David, 2012. Competition Law. OUP Oxford. ISBN 978-0-
19-958655-4.  
 
WHISH, Richard and BAILEY, David, 2015. Competition Law. Oxford University Press. 
ISBN 978-0-19-966037-7.  
 
2. List of Cited Internet Resources 
GERADIN, Damien and GIRGENSON, Ianis, 2011. ID 1970917: The Counterfactual 
Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach [online]. 
SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. [Accessed 7 
March 2019]. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1970917 
 
GERADIN, Damien, 2010a. Is the guidance paper on the commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying article 102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct useful? Available at 
SSRN 1569502. 2010. 
 
HANNAK, Aniko, SOELLER, Gary, LAZER, David, MISLOVE, Alan and WILSON, 
Christo, 2014. Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-commerce Web Sites. In: 
Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference [online]. New 
York, NY, USA: ACM. 2014. p. 305–318. [Accessed 14 March 2019]. IMC ’14. ISBN 978-
1-4503-3213-2. Available from: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2663716.2663744 
 
IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, Pablo and LAMADRID, Alfonso, 2016. ID 2849831: On the Notion 
of Restriction of Competition: What We Know and What We Don’t Know We Know 
[online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 
[Accessed 17 October 2018]. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2849831 
 
MONTI, Giorgio, [no date]. Abuse of a Dominant Position: A Post-Intel Calm? [online]. 




NIÑO, López and YAEL, Jonás, 2015. Importancia de una teoría del daño en casos de 







Self-Preferencing: Yet Another Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 2019. 




ŠMEJKAL, V. and DUFKOVÁ, B., 2015. Prŭvodce aktuální judikaturou Soudního dvora 
EU k ochraně hospodářské soutěže: 77 rozsudkŭ z let 2006-2015 [online]. ISBN 978-80-
87975-26-8. Available from: https://books.google.cz/books?id=XyA2jwEACAAJ 
 
ŠMEJKAL, Václav, 2015b. ID 2596769: On Periodization of EU Antitrust Development: 
Are We in a New Phase? [online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. [Accessed 17 April 2019]. Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2596769 
 
The ARA “consent decree” – a new enforcement tool for abuse cases ante portas?, 2016. 




TOR, Avishalom, 2018. ID 3291886: Should Antitrust Survive Behavioral Economics? 
[online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 
[Accessed 16 February 2019]. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3291886 
 
ZENGER, Hans and WALKER, Mike, 2012. ID 2009296: Theories of Harm in European 
Competition Law: A Progress Report [online]. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network. [Accessed 27 May 2018]. Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2009296. 
 
3. List of Cited Legislative Materials 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission 
of the European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws - 
Exchange of interpretative letters with the Government of the United States of America, OJ 
L 95, 27.4.1995, p. 47–52, CELEX 21995A0427(01). 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, pp. 1-7. 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 13–388. 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, pp. 47-390. 
Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L1/1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1-25. 
Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, OJ L 395 30.12.1989, pp. 1-12. 
Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 





Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Text with EEA 
relevance) OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 37–69. 
Protocol (No 27), On the Internal Market and Competition, annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and Treaty on the Functionning of the European Union. 
 
4. List of Cited Case Law 
 
Case Law of the Court of Justice (chronologically) 
Joined Cases C-56/64 and C-58/64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Community, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41. 
Case C-5/69, Franz Völk v Établissements J. Vervaecke, ECLI:EU:C:1969:35. 
Case C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v 
Commission, EU:C:1973:22. 
Case C-85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European 
Communities, EU:C:1979:36. 
Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, EU:C:1991:286. 
Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v Commission, EU:C:2009:214. 
Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline 
Services and Others v Commission and Others, EU:C:2009:610. 
Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, EU:C:2010:603. 
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, EU:C:2011:83. 
Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2012:172. 
Case C-549/10 P, Tomra Systems ASA and Others v Commission, EU:C:2012:221. 
Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, 
EU:C:2014:2062. 
Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH, 
EU:C:2015:477. 
Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2015:651. 
Case C‑413/14 P, Intel Corporation Inc. v European Commission, EU:C:2017:632. 
Case C-525/16, MEO — Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia SA v Autoridade da 
Concorrência, EU:C:2018:270. 
 
Case Law of the General Court (chronologically) 






Case T-340/03, France Télécom SA v Commission, EU:T:2007:22. 
Case T-271/08, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, EU:T:2008:101. 
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. 
Case T-301/04, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v Commission, 
EU:T:2009:317. 
Case T-533/08, Telekomunikacja Polska v Commission, EU:T:2010:105. 
Case T-155/06, Tomra Systems ASA and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2010:370. 
Case T-336/07, Telefónica, SA, and Telefónica de España, SA, v Commission, 
EU:T:2012:172. 
Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v Commission, EU:T:2014:547. 
Case T-851/14, Slovak Telekom, a.s., v Commission, EU:T:2018:929. 
 
Case Law of the Commission (chronologically) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Council Regulation • No 17 concerning notification No 
IV/30.228 (The Distillers Company p.l.c.), document JOC_1983_245_R_0003_01, OJ 
C245/3, 14.9.1983, pp 3-4. 
Commission Decision of 24 January 1999 in Case IV.F.1/36.718, CECED, OJ L187/47, 
26.7.2000, pp. 47-54. 
Commission Decision of 25 July 2001 in Case COMP/C-1/36.915, Deutsche Post AG, OJ L 
331/40, 15.12.2001, pp. 40-78. 
Commission Decision of 20 March 2001 in Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, OJ L 
125/27, 5.5.2001, pp. 27–44. 
Commission Decision of 20 June 2001 in Case COMP/E-2/36.041/PO, Michelin, OJ L 
143/1, 30.5.2002, pp. 1-53. 
Commission Decision of 5 December 2001 in Case COMP/37.859, De Post-La Poste, OJ L 
61/32, 2.3.2002, pp. 32-53. 
Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 in Cases COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, 
Deutsche Telekom AG, OJ L 263/9, 14.10.2003, pp. 9-41. 
Commission Decision in Case COMP/38.233, Wanadoo Interactive. 
Commission Decision of 27 August 2003 in Case COMP/37.685, Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A. 
Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft 
Cooperation. 
Commission Decision of 2 June 2004 in Case COMP/38.096, Clearstream Internatinoal SA 
and Clearstream Banking AG. 
Commission Decision of 15 June 2005 in Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3, AstraZeneca. 
Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 in Case COMP/E-1/38.113, Prokent-Tomra. 
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 in Case COMP/38.784,Telefónica. 
Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 in Case COMP/37.990, Intel. 





Commission Decision of 5 March 2014 in Case AT.39984, Romanian Power Exchange / 
OPCOM. 
Commission Decision of 29 April 2014 in Case AT.39985, Motorola. 
Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 in Case AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier). 
Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 in Case AT.39523, Slovak Telekom. 
Commission Decision of 20 September 2016 in Case AT.39759, ARA. 
Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 in case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping). 
Commission Decision of 2 October 2017 in Case AT.39813, Baltic rail. 
Summary of Commission Decision of 21 March 2018 in Case COMP/M.8084, 
Bayer/Monsanto, OJ C 459/10, 20.12.2018, pp. 10-23. 
 
5. List of Other Resources 
Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings. OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, pp. 7–20, CELEX 52009XC0224(01). 
Communication from the Commission — Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, pp. 97–118, CELEX 52004XC0427(07). 
Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
C 167/19, 13.6.2013, pp. 19–21, CELEX 52013XC0613(04). 
COMP@60 - digital publication about 60 years of EU Competition Policy, Phillip Lowe: 
The Origins of the Chief Economist Team: Mission, early achievement and challenges. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/compat60/memories/pdf/019-lowe.pdf 
European Parliament resolution of 31 January 2019 on the Annual Report on Competition 
Policy (2018/2102(INI)), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-
2019-0062+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
LAITENBERGER Johannes, Accuracy and administrability go hand in hand, CRA 
Conference Brussels, 12 December 2017 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_24_en.pdf. 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S 
v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2015:343. 
Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Case C‑549/10 P, Tomra and Others v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:55. 
Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C‑413/14 P, Intel Corporation Inc. v European 
Commission, EU:C:2016:788. 










Předmětem této diplomové práce je studie dopadu modernizace soutěžního práva 
Evropské unie v oblasti zneužití dominantního postavení. Mapuje využití analýzy efektů 
protisoutěžního jednání a standardu spotřebitelského blahobytu v případech zneužití 
dominantního postavení ve smyslu článku 102 Smlouvy of fungování Evropské unie. Studie je 
vedena formou rozboru teorií újmy prezentovaných v rozhodovací praxi Evropské komise 
v rozhodnutích o zneužití dominance za posledních dvacet let. 
Práce začíná teoretickou diskuzí a vymezením mantinelů diskrece Komise stanovených 
judikaturou unijních soudů. Poté následuje krátký popis procesu modernizace unijního 
soutěžního práva. V analytické části práce jsou potom rozhodnutí Komise posuzována vzhledem 
ke dvěma kritériím. V návaznosti na první kritérium je kladena otázka, zda Komise při svém 
posuzování provedla analýzu efektu zkoumaného jednání. Druhým kritériem je, zda Komise ve 
svém rozhodnutí vzala v potaz standard spotřebitelského blahobytu. Poslední kapitola pak 
obsahuje diskuzi výsledků této analýzy. 
Závěrem této práce je, že v průběhu času začala Komise častěji přistupovat k analýze 
efektů protisoutěžního jednání, přičemž se zpravidla pokouší vzít v nějaké formě v potaz 
standard spotřebitelského blahobytu. Nad rámec tohoto obecného závěru je třeba zmínit některé 
konkrétnější závěry ohledně teorií újmy prezentovaných Komisí. 
V první řadě jde o skutečnost, že hloubka a kvalita analýzy efektů provedené Komisí je 
proměnlivá případ od případu bez jasného, právně a fakticky relevantního důvodu. Prostor pro 
zlepšení lze vysledovat i v otázce jasnosti a transparentnosti teorií újmy formulovaných 
v rozhodnutích Komise. V některých případech není příliš zřetelně identifikován právní standard, 
který vedl Komisi k jejímu rozhodnutí. Podle takového standardu by bylo možné ve prospěch 
právní jistoty určit jasnější hranici, kde začíná protiprávnost daného jednání. 
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This master’s thesis presents a study of the impact of European Union competition law on 
the area of abuse of dominance. It maps the usage of the effects-based approach and consumer 
welfare standard in abuse of dominance cases pursuant to Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. This is done by an analysis of the theories of harm advanced 
in the case law of the European Commission in prohibition decisions from the last twenty years.  
The thesis begins by a theoretical discussion and outline of the boundaries to the 
Commission’s discretion in this area, as set by Union courts. Then, a short description of the 
process of competition law modernisation in Europe continues. In the subsequent analytical part, 
the cases are tested against two criteria. The first criterion is whether the Commission has 
analysed the actual or likely effects of a dominant undertaking’s conduct. The second criterion is 
whether the Commission tested the pertinent conduct against a consumer welfare standard. In the 
final chapter, the results of the analysis are discussed. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that the Commission’s case law did shift to a more 
effects-based approach over time and that the Commission does attempt to take the consumer 
welfare standard into account in some way in most of its decisions. Beyond this general result, 
there are some remaining issues, though. 
First, the depth and quality of the Commission’s analysis seems to differ case to case 
without any clear, legally or factually relevant reason. Second, there is room for improvement in 
the clarity and transparency in the theories of harm advanced by the Commission. Some cases do 
not identify clear legal standards that led the Commission to its decision. Such a standard could 
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